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PREFACE 
This work is concerned with the role Finland played in the Second 
World War. The primary objective is to study the Finnish involvement 
in the war between Russia and Germany .. The author faced a difficulty 
in that the amount of available primary source material in this area of 
study in the years from 1942 to 1945 is rather limited. Using what 
sources that were available and utilizing secondary material when 
necessary, the author hopes to present a balanced picture of Finnish 
intentions, aspirations, and motivations in World War II. 
The author wishes to acknowledge his gratitude to his major 
adviser, Dr. Douglas Hale, for his assistance in developing this work. 
Further thanks are extended to Dr. Jack Sylvester and Dr. Bernard 
Eissenstatt for their aid. 
Special thanks are extended to my mother for her encouragement, 
to my supervisors at my job, Dennis McDow and Clarence Buller, for 
their patience at the often below standard level of work while I was 
more occupied with this thesis than my job. Finally, a very special 
thanks is extended to my fiancee, Miss Terresa McCoy, for her work in 
typing and for her patience and encouragement. 
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CHAPTER I 
RUSSIA AND FINLAND 
During the Second World War, small nations were used by the major 
powers for whatever purpose either side deemed desirable. This fact was 
most clearly demonstrated in the war between Germany and the Soviet 
Union. Poland, Rumania, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia are all examples 
of the exploitation and v.ictimization of the small powers by the large 
nations. Farther to the north, a struggle developed that is one of the 
clearest demonstrations of this process which the war produced. For 
nearly six years, Finland was subjected to pressure and war from both 
Germany and Russia. This paper will be concerned primarily with the 
dealings between Finland and Germany during World War II. 
The significance of this study is that the relationship between 
Finland, Germany, and Russia provides the clearest picture of how the 
major powers endeavored to use a smaller nation to their advantage. 
Moreover, Finland is the only country which was able to withstand to 
any degree the pressures brought by both sides. Finally, Finland is 
one of the few nations bordering on Russia which were not brought under 
Communist control after the war and in which the process of great power 
influence on smaller countries may be freely investigated. 
The purpose of this thesis is to study an aspect of World War II 
which is often neglected. The relationship of diplomacy to strategy 
was one of the most important factors in the war, and it is one which 
2 
has received the least attention by historians. This paper will 
examine what happened in the three-cornered relationship among Finland, 
Russia, and Germany. It will further attempt to show why events 
happened as they did. As much as possible, translated German and 
Russian documents, memoirs, and other primary sources will be used to 
interrelate the actions of the governments involved, the personalities 
of the important Finnish leaders, and the circumstances which influenced 
important decisions in the far northern theatre bf the'· war. While the 
basic purpose of tqis study will be to examine German-Finnish relations 
in World War II, it is impassible to understand this subject without 
realizing the decisive influence of Russia throughout Finnish history. 
Because the Scandinavian peninsula has tended to be a neglected part of 
Europe, this paper will consider ';Finnish history from the nineteenth 
A 
century to establish an introduction to the relationship between Finland 
and Russia. 
The history of Finland from its annexation by Russia in 1808 to 
the outbreak of war in 1939 is largely the story of the Russian desire 
to protect its territory. The proximity of the Finnish border to 
St. Petersburg has always been a matter of concern for the Russian 
government, whether of the czars or the·connnissars. As one.professor 
at the University of Turku noted at the beginning of the nineteenth 
century, "We must pray to God that Rus~ia will succeed in situating its 
capital in Constantinople. Then it might ieave Finland in peace under 
the scepter of Sweden. But, now that its capital city is located so 
near, I am afraid that Finland will sooner or later fall under the power 
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of Russia. 111 This fear had already been confirmed by a statement of 
Peter the Great: "The ladies of St. Petersburg could not sleep peace-
fully as long as the Finnish frontier ran so close to our capital. 112 
The thought of an invasion of Russia through Finland dominated Russian 
military strategy. To remove this threat, Russia was determined to 
control Finland. 
• 
Under Czar Alexander I, Russia for~ed Sweden to give up Finland by 
the Treaty of Fredrickshannn on Sepfentber 17, 1809. Th~ new province 
was organized as an autonomous Grand Duchy along constitutional lines. 
T:Jhile the constitution was not particularly liberal, it was a departure 
from the principles of Russian autocracy which recognized only the Czar 
as supreme. The Duchy was to be administered by a Diet, made up of 
four Estates and presided over by a Governor General appointed by the 
Czar. A Finnish Af,fa.irs Committee at St. Petersburg, headed by a 
Finnish Secretary of State, provided a direct line of communication 
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between the Finns and the Czar. 
The action of the Czar in giving Finland a constitution, while 
seemingly contradictory to normal Russian political practices, was not 
as radical as might be believed. The Finnish Diet was in reality a 
carry-over from the days of Swedish rule; for the Czar to continue this 
practice was an effective way to pacify the Finns who had been loyal to 
1 Quoted in Eino Jutikkala~ !:_History.Qi. Finland (New York: 
Fredrick A. Praeger, 1962), p. 176. 
2 Quoted in Max Jakobson,~ Diplomacy .2f the Winter War 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961), p. 14. 
3Hugh Shearman, Finland: The Adventures of ~Small Power (London: 
Stevens and Sons Limited, 1950), pp. 15-19. · 
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Sweden in the war of 1808-1809. Also, the ideas of constitutional 
monarchy were quite strong in Europe at this time, and the Czar and 
his chief advisor, Mikhail Speransky, decided to establish Finland as an 
experimental area for their application. At the same.· time, the Czar 
continued to exercise many important functions of the government; the 
4 Diet, moreover, could not be convened except by the Czar. The most. 
important feature of this settlement was that Finland became an auto-
nomous region within the Russian Empire. It has internal and domestic 
freedom of action; in short, it was Finnish rather than Russian. 
For most.of the nineteenth century, Finland was virtually a 
separate nation. Few Russian troops were ever stationed in Finland, even 
during the First World War. Taxation was levied for internal uses and 
not to enrich the Imperial treasury. While Finland did not have a 
separate army until 1878, Finns who wished to make a career in the 
military were free to serve in the Russian army. 5 Under the Grand Duchy, 
the capital was moved from Turku; near the Swedish border, to Helsinki. 
As an autonomous province, Finland was exposed to the ideals and 
thoughts of western Europe. Finland's system of education was among 
the finest in Europe. The spirit of nationalism spread to Finland 
through the university at Turku and became a basic tenet among Finnish 
intellectuals. The excellent education system further disseminated the 
ideas of national pride and independenqe which were to become fully 
4John H. Wuorinen, A History of Finland (New York and London: 
Columbia University Press, 1965), pp. 128-131. · 
5 W.R. Me~de, Finland (London: Ernst Benn Limited, 1968), pp. 101-
110. 
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developed in 1918. 6 Finland was no longer part of Sweden; its citizens 
could not be made Russians. In the words of Johann Wilhelm Snellman, a 
Finnish intellectual, "Swedes we are no longer. Russians we ca:r;mot 
become; we must be F.d.nns. 117 
Despite the rise of nationalism, relations between Finland and 
Russia remained friendly. Under Russian control, Finland underwent a 
period of industrialization during the last half of the nineteenth 
century. The coming of railroads, an efficient canal system, hydro-
electric power, lumber mills, and textile factories brought great pros-
perity to the Finns. 8 At the same time they established a monetary 
system independent of the Russian scheme; by 1878, the Finnish mark was 
approximately equal to the French franc·instead of merely a fraction of 
the Russian ruble. 9 During the Crimean War, attacks by the British 
navy strengthened a feeling of comradeship between the Finns and the 
Russians; a popular saying is still heard in parts of Finland: "to 
laugh like an Englishman who has set fire to the harbor. 1110 The Finnish 
Life Guard Light Battalions were part of the Imperial Guard after 1829 
and served loyally, distinguishing themselves in the Polish campaign of 
1831, the Hungarian campagin of 1849, the Crimean War, and the Russo-
Turkish war of 1877-78.11 Throughout the nineteenth century, Finland 
6 Shearman, pp. 31~32. 
7Quoted in Jutikkala, p. 203. 
8 Shearman, pp. 25-26. 
9 Jutikkala, p. 217. 
10 Meade, p. 141. 
11Anatole Mazour, Finland Between East and West (Princeton, N .J.: 
D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1965), p. 18. 
was loyal to Russia, although the spirit of nationalism was gradually 
growing, particularly in the middle and upper classes. 
6 
The same industrial and technological development which brought 
prosperity to the middle and upper classes of Finland also meant the 
beginning of a class struggle which would eventually bring civil war to 
Finland in 1918. Rural laborers and tenant farmers in the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries faced poor housing, low wages, high 
prices for their necessities, hunger, disease, and a sense of inferiority 
because of their treatment by the larger landowners and independent 
farmers. For industrial workers, pay and working conditions were among 
the worst in Europe. While trade unions made their appearance around 
1880, they exerted little influence until the 1920's.12 
The reign of Nicholas II saw the end of Russian tolerance for 
Finnish autonomy. Russian nationalism had been growing as fast as 
Finnish, and the idea that Finland should be used to advance Russian 
interests and fortune was beginning to influence the thinking of Russian 
ruling circles. As one Russian minister put it, "We have not subjugated 
alien races to give them pleasure, but because we need them. 1113 A 
further development of this Great Russian ethnocentrism, which gained 
considerable strength after the assassination of Czar Alexander II, was 
the suspicion that the patriotism of minority groups within the Empire 
was subversive, if not treasonable, and should be eliminated. The only 
national sentiment to be tolerated was that of the Great Russians. The 
12 Shearman, pp. 35-36. 
13Quoted in Jutikkala, p. 228, 
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process of Russification began in Finland about 1891 when Russian was 
declared the sole official language in the higher branches of the govern-
ment. Not long thereafter, Russian-born officials were appointed to 
. t, , th F, , h . .1 , 14 posi ions in e innis civi service. These measures, along with 
the absorption of the Finnish postal service into the Russian in 1890, 
were forerunners of the more extensive attempts to eliminate Finnish 
autonomy which began in 1898. 
In 1899, .the Czar declared that the Finnish Diet was no longer 
empowered to enact new laws; its function henceforth was merely to draft 
opinions on measures submitted to it by the Russian government. In a 
manifesto issued on February 15, 1899, Nicholas II declared that while 
the Diet was allowed to pass laws concerning the internal affairs of 
Finland, the Czar reserved the right to decide which laws were strictly 
local and which came under authority of the Russian government. This 
action virtually eliminated the power of the Diet, since the Czar could 
decide that any piece of legislation involved more than internal Finnish 
affairs and therefore was outside the authority of the Diet. A petition 
signed by 522,931 Finns protesting the Czar's action was submitted to 
the Imperial Court at St. Petersburg and rejecteda A similar protest, 
Pro Finlandia, signed by more than a thousand of Europe's leading 
citizens, was also brushed aside. 15 In view of Nicholas' coronation 
pledge to respect Finland's privileged position, the Finns began to 
refer to him as the "Perjurer". 
14 Mazour, p, 17, 
lSW , uorinen, pp. 202-204. 
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The net result of the Czar's actions was to alienate the three 
million people who had been his most loyal subjects. A resistance move-
ment, the Kagaali, came into existence; its doctrine urged mainly 
passive resistance, but resistance nevertheless. A new division 
developed in Finnish politics. The Constitutionalists, a party composed 
of Finns who advocated a return to the constitution and who stood ready 
to resist the Czar, now opposed the compliance party, a group who 
believed the new laws were to be obeyed even though unpopular. The 
Russians continued their repression, discontinued the sale of stamps 
bearing the Finnish coat of arms in 1901, instituted censorship of the 
press, and put pressure on Finnish schools to teach more Russian, The 
Finnish army was made to draft Finns to serve in the Russian army under 
Russian officers. The Finns responded by refusing to report for duty 
when called, by issuing underground publications, and refusing to learn 
R O 16 ussian. 
The Russo-Japanese War and the subsequent domestic disorder in 
Russia caused a temporary pause in the process of Russification. Between 
1905 and 1908, Finland resumed its autonomous status and came to a new 
understanding with Russia. A new law transformed the Diet into a single-
chamber assembly of two hundred members elected by secret ballot, and 
suffrage ~as extended to all citizens of both sexes over twenty~four 
years of age. The conscription system was abandoned on the condition 
17 that Finland would contribute money in place of men. From 1905 to 
1908, Finland was one of the most democratic and prosperous nations in 
16 Meade, pp. 143-144. 
17 Mazour, p. 25. 
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the world. Then reaction set in, and the Russification program was 
intensified. 
Beginning in 1908, the Russian government again decided that 
Finland's Diet could no longer act on matters involving Russian inter-
ests. After 1910 native Russians were appointed to the Diet; in addi-
tion, Russian was again designated as the official language of the 
government. Public officials who attempted to uphold the Finnish consti-
tution and laws were arrested and sent to prison or Siberian exile. 
Among those so exiled was Pehr Evind Svinhufvud, who was later to become 
the first president of Finland. By 1914, constitutional government in 
Finland had been abolished. As a result of the harsh new measures, the 
goal of independence from Russia became a national aspiration rather 
than the dream of a few individuals. 18 Still there was no violence or 
outright opposition, but rather a subtle refusal on the part of the 
Finnish population to cooperate with the Russian government. 
World War I brought a new period of prosperity to Finland, but it 
also brought new measures of repression from Russia. Martial law was 
hastily imposed, and Finnish citizens were frequently arrested and sub-
jected to Russian law. Grounds of military necessity were used by the 
Czar as a pretext to further reduce Finland to a servile position. 
Although at first some Finns offered to serve in the Russian army, 
their enthusiasm soon died. By the time Russia left the war, as many 
F . . . h G . h R · 19 inns were serving int e erman army as int e ussian army. 
18T.T • wuorinen, pp. 206-207. 
19 Mazour, pp. 35-36. 
One 
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such unit of Finnish volunteers, the Lockstedt Jaegers, would also play 
an important role in the Finnish Civil War. 
The attitude of the Finns toward the war was generally more favor-
able to Germany than to Russia. There are two basic reasons for this. 
First of all, Finland had intellectual and commercial ties with Germany; 
hence it was easier to deal with Germany than other nations, with the 
exception of neutral Sweden. Secondly, the fact that Germany seemed to 
be winning the war was a strong stimulus to pro-German sentiment. It 
would be to Germany's advantage to detach Finland from Russia, although 
the German foreign service did not promise the Finns more than a 
guarantee of Finnish autonomy if a peace conference was held. On the 
other hand, Finnish negotiations with England and France would accom-
plish little, since, as allies of Russia, they would not be likely to 
f R ' ' F' 1 . d 20 orce ussia to grant any concessions to in an. This did not mean 
that Finland condoned Germany's actions such as the invasion of Belgium. 
The basic rationale was simply that defeat of Russia would mean better 
conditions for Finland; the matter of whordefeated Russia was irrelevant. 
Until 1918, the main contribution of Germany co Finnish aspirations 
was the training of two thousands Finns. Despite the effort of the 
Russian government to thwart the scheme, the men were raised, sent to 
Sweden and then to Germany. They were trained at Lockstedt, Holstein, 
and were designated the 27th Battalion of the Royal Prussian Jaegers in 
May, 1916. They saw some action in Lithuania as a unit but were mainly 
used as scouts and spies by the Germans. 21 
20Jutikkala, p. 249. 
21 Shearman, p. 53. 
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In March, 1917, the Czar was forc~d .to abdicate in favor of the 
revolutionary Provisional Goverrnnent led by Prince Lvov. This action 
created confusion among the Finns. On March 20, Finland was granted a 
return to its status as an autonomous region of Russia. Political 
amnesty was declared, allowing men who had been deported for political 
reasons to return. The problem was that the new Provisional Government 
opposed total independence for Finland. The Finnish leaders were 
divided ori the best course of action: to go for full independence, or 
to accept autonomy with Finnish control of domestic affairs and Russian 
control of military and foreign affairs. The latter view was held by 
the Social Democrats,, who, in their desire to raise(the position of the 
common worker, believed that a totally separate Finland would mean 
worse exploitation of the workers by the bourgeoisie while close ties 
with the new democratic Russian state would have a beneficial impact on 
F . ' h ' 1 d' ' 22 innis socia con itions. 
On July 18, 1917, by a vote of 155 to 36, the Diet enacted legisla-
tion which provided that since the Russian monarchy was no longer in 
existence, the Finnish Diet alone would henceforth perform the functions 
of the Czar with regard to Finland. The Diet assumed the power to enact 
all laws concerning internal Finnish affairs, such as taxation, customs, 
etc. Foreign affairs were left under the jurisdiction of the Russian 
government. In effect, the Diet would constitute the government of 
Finland, and, except for foreign and military policy, the Russian 
government would have no authority over Finnish affairs. For all prac-
tical purposes, the implementation of this law would have meant 
22Ibid. , p. 54 • 
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independence for Finland. The Russian government, realizing the 
significance of the new law, held that the Diet had exceeded its 
authority and, on July 31, ordered it dissolved. New elections, held 
on October 1-2, cost the Social Democrats the majority they had held in 
the Diet and returned an even more nationalistic government to power. 
The new Diet convened on November l; the Bolshevik revolution took 
23 place on the seventh, and this changed the picture altogether. 
The disorder accompanying the November revolution in Russia caused 
the Finnish Diet to decide in favor of complete independence. The Pro-
gressive Party was in control, .and the president, Pehr Svinhufvud, 
submitted a declaration of independence. On December 6, 1917, Finland 
announced its independence by a vote in the Diet of 100 to 88. The proc-
lamation, in addition to declaring Finland an independent nation, 
empowered the government to take whatever measures necessary to win 
24 diplomatic recognition of Finland from foreign powers. 
Independence was achieved, but there were problems. The Social 
Democrats were somewhat confused and divided. Some wanted to follow 
the Russian example and proclaim a Finhish Soviet Republic, but the 
majority was uncertain about the wisdom of such an action. As a result 
of this division, there was no immediate revolution, despite appeals 
from Russia. ThE:lre were riots, various disorders, and strikes through-
out Finland, but no general revolt. Interestingly enough, the Soviet 
Union became the first nation to recognize Finland; formal recognition 
23w . uorinen, pp. 213-214. 
24Ibid., pp. 215-216. 
came.in an official dispatch to Helsinki signed by Lenin, Stalin, and 
25 Trotsky on January 4, 1918. 
Why did the new Bolshevik Government agree to Finland's indepen-
dence? The main reason was that.the Bolsheviks were too weak and t-o 
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occupied with other problems t<i> do anything else. The Soviet government 
was on a shaky foundation, and civil war seemed likely.· Aside from that 
sad fact, there were other considerations. The Bolsheviks had declared 
that small nations had the right to determine their own destiny; this 
was a convenient chance to prove their sincerity. Finally, if a revolu-
tion later began in Finland, Russia could easily move in to aid in 
establishing a CoI!llllunist regime.· At the time, the Bolshevi~s still 
clung to the belief in a world revolution which would destroy all 
bourgeois states; the present government of Finland, therefore, would 
b h O 26 e no more tan a temporary nuisance. 
Th~ threat of a Marxist revolt,was more than a dream of the rulers 
of the Soviet Union. The position of the working class had been 
unfavorable before the war, and by the end of 1917, conditions were. 
much worse. The Civil Guards, often called the White Guards, had been 
organized throughout Fin.land to drive out the Russian soldiers; their 
membership was drawn mainly from the middle and upper class. The 
Socialists, seeing a threat in this action, organized the Red Guards to 
defend the rights of the working class and to achieve the aims of the 
25Report by Stalin to the All-Russian Central Executive.Committee 
on the Independence of Finland, January 4, 1918, .Soviet Documents .Q.!!. 
Foreign Policy, Jane Degras, ed., (London: Oxford University Press, 
1953), Vol~ I, pp. 29-31. 
26 Mazour, p. 46. 
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27 labor movement. In addition, there were about 40,000 Russian troops 
in Finland, and there was no sign that they would be quickly recalled. 
On November 12, the radical wing of the Social Democratic Party formed 
the Central Revolutionary Council and proclaimed a general strike, The 
strike, which lasted until November 20, was accompanied by considerable 
fighting between Red and White Guards, bloodshed, and destruction of 
property. It also ended any hope of compromise between .the Socialists 
28 · and the bourgeoisie. Finland was an armed camp, without adequate 
polic~ or military forces and totally occupied by foreign troops. 
Furthermore, Russian leaders exhorted the Finnish Socialists to revolt 
and promised aid. Civil war became a certainty. 
By January 23, 1918, France, Germany, Sweden, Greece, Norway, 
Denmark, Austria-Hungary, Switzerland, and the Netherlands had joined 
the Soviet Union in extending recognition to Finland. Great Britain 
and the United States hesitated because of Finnish ties with Germany. 
By May, recognition had come from Spain, the Vatican, Bulgaria, Turkey, 
29 
and Argentina, In the meantime, the Finnish civil war had broken out, 
In an effort to restore law and order to the country, the Diet 
authorized Svinhufvud to organize a police force to control the mounting 
disorders on January 12. On the ~wenty-fifth, the Civil Guards were 
recognized as the lel•l armed force of Finland, The army was to be 
grouped and trained at the town of Vaasa in the province of Ostrobothnia 
27 Shearman, pp, 58-59, 
28 Wuorinen, pp, 216-217, 
29 Tancred Borenius, Field Marshal Mannerheim (London and Melbourne: 
Hutchinson & Co, Limited, 1940), pp, 85-89, 
on the west coast of Finland. On January 27, Svinhufvud and some of 
his cabinet left Helsinki for Vaasa. The next day, the Red Guards 
30 
seized Helsinki and proclaimed a revolutionary government. 
The Socialists seem to.have planned on a quick and relatively 
peaceful coup d'etat. The capital and the organs of government were 
15 
seized; the majority of the government leaders were arrested 9r forced 
underground. As yet the government had no effective armed forces, and 
no foreign power was likely to be able to intervene on short notice. 
On the other hand, the Red Guards consisted of 30,000 men who, though 
poorly trained, were united and ready to act. About 40,000 Russian 
troops were also ready to help, and Lenin had agreed to supply arms to 
the revolutionaries. It seemed to the Socialists that the seizure of 
power in Finland could be accompLished quickly and without a great deal 
' of fighting. Kullervo Manner was named chairman of the new government, 
while Eero Haapalainen, a former journalist with no military experience, 
was named Commander-in-Chief of the Red Guards. His Chief of Staff was 
Ali Aaltonon, a Finn who had been an officer in the Russian army during 
31 the Russo-Japanese War. Their belief that the legal government would 
go.down without offering any serious resistance made the lack of training 
and proper leadership seem inconsequential to the revolutionary govern-
ment. 
The legal government, however, was not quite as helpless as the 
Socialists believed. Around Vaasa was a concentration of men who would 
serve as the nucleus of a Finnish army. Also in Vaasa were Svinhufvud, 
30w , uorinen, p. 219. 
31 Shearman, p. 61. 
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several members of his cabinet, and a man who was capable of leading 
the White Guards to victory. His name was Gustaf Mannerheim, 
Mannerheim was formerly a high-ranking officer in the Russian army, 
He had seen action in the Russo-Japanese War and, though a Finn, was a 
member of aristocratic Russian society. He also spoke six languages 
and had gained considerable stature as the leader of a research expedi-
tion into Siberia and Mongolia in 1906. In 1914, he had been in, 
command of the Cavalry Brigade of Guards in Warsaw, and, in August, had 
earned the Russian Sabre of St. George for stopping the Austrian advance 
against Lublin where the Fourth Russian Army was being concentrated. In 
early October, 1914, he managed, on his own initiative, to secure the 
only possible retreat route for the army of General Delsal and was 
responsible for saving this army. For this feat, he was awarded Russia's 
highest military award, the Fourth Class of the Order of St. George, 
In February, 1915, he was in command of the Twentieth Cavalry Division 
on the Polish front, Galicia and Bukowina. At the end of 1916, he 
held a command in the Carpathians of Rumania; in mid-1917, he was pro-
moted to lieutenant general and was given command of the Sixth Cavalry 
Army Corps of the Rumanian front, 32 As the Russian army disintegrated 
in mutiny and disease, Mannerheim returned to Finland. In January, 
1918, Svinhufvud asked him to take over the command of the Finnish army, 
organize and train it, 
On January 27, Mannerheim had the Russian troops in Ostrobothnia 
arrested and disarmed. A few days prior to this, the Russians in 
northern and central Karelia had been captured, Mannerheim had about 
32B . orenius, pp. 36-37 
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40,000 poorly trained and ill-equipped men at his disposal. At this 
point, he was taking a gamble; resolute resistance by the Russians 
combined with an attack by the Red Guards would have scattered his 
forces and brought a Communist victory. But by February, northern 
Finland had been secured, and preparations were made to move into south-
ern Finland. Conscription was used to secure men; arms and equipment 
were purchased from Sweden. Leadership and a highly trained cadre werei 
provided when Germany returned the Lockstedt Jaegers to Finlana. 33 
The Socialist forces had the advantage of numbers but little else. 
The Russians were poorly disciplined and lacked effective leadership, 
while the Finnish rebel forces included criminals and other disreputable 
elements which were.hard to control. Because of the close association 
of the revolutionaries with Moscow as well as the violence committed 
by units and individuals of the Red army, the Finnish population tended 
to be .Jnore loyal to the legal government. By February, 1918, the Reds 
held only about ten percent of the nation's area; that ten percent 
contained fifty percent of the population and virtually all Finnish 
indusg:-y, however. 34 A Red offensive which lasted from February 
twentieth to the twenty-fifth failed, mainly because of a shipment of 
German munitions to the Whites. 
While Mannerheim had been pushing the Russians and Red Guards out 
of Finland, Svinhufvud had asked Germany to send an expedition to aid 
the Finns. While at first reluctant because of the concurrent peace 
negotiations between Russia and Germany, the German Imperial 
33 Shearman, pp. 63-65. 
34Jutikkala, pp. 256-257. 
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Headquarters agreed on February 21 to send a division. Mannerheim pro-
tested, believing that the Finns should fight alone, but agreed when 
assurances were given that the Germans would not meddle in Finnish 
' t 1 1' ' 35 in erna po 1t1cs. 
The Russians signed a treaty of friendship with the Finnish 
Socialists on March 1; at the same time, large amounts of Russian muni-
tions were distributed to the Red Guards. 36 On March 7, the Red Guards 
launched a second offensive against White-occupied Finland. While the 
operation was ostensibly directed by Eero Haapalainen, it was in reality, 
engineered by a Russian officer, Colonel Svetshnikoff. Besides sending 
a large quantity of war material, the Russians supplied the technical 
experts who were also involved in the battle. The offensive was halted, 
however, and the initiative now shifted to Mannerheim. On March 15, 
the White offensive began against Tampere, Finland's second most impor-
tant city. After battles at Laenkipohja, Orivesi, Lembois, and 
Vehmais, Tampere was cut off, On March 28, the orders were given to 
attack Tampere, which fell on April 6 after a savage and determined 
resistance by the Reds. 37 
On April 3, a German force of 9,500 men under Major General 
Ruediger von der Goltz landed at Hangoe; on April 7, a second force of 
2,500 men under Colonel von Brandenstein disembarked at Loviisa. They 
advanced on Helsinki, which had been abandoned by the Russians after 
35w . uorinen, p, 221. 
36 Treaty of Friendship with the Finnish Socialist Workers' Republic, 
Soviet Documents .2.!l Foreign Policy, Vol. I, pp, 47-48, 
37 Borenius, pp, 137-148. 
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the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, and entered the city on April 13. The 
capital of Red Finland was moved to Vyborg. After cutting a Russian 
raiding expedition to shreads at Rautus, the Whites and Germans closed 
in on Vybo~g and the.last pockets of Red resistance. Vyborg was 
surrounded ori April 26 and finally surrendered on May 1, 38 
The war had left its mark. After about .20,000 Finns had died, four 
hundred industrial firms had suffered partial or complete destruction, 
and Finland was facing famine, Of the Red forces, some.individuals, 
such as Kullervo Manner and Otto Kuusinen, escaped to Russia, some were 
shot, some joined the British Expeditionary Force in Murmansk and later 
returned to Finland, and some went to Sweden, Canada, or the United 
States. About ten thousand died from starvation and disease in prison 
39 
camps. 
The new Finnish state was faced by formidable problems, The exact 
form of government had not been decided. For a time, a scheme to name 
a German prince to the Finnish throne was considered, but·the victory of 
<:lermany's enemies caused this idea to be abandoned. In July, 1919, a 
new constitution was adopted establishing Finland as the first 
Scandinavian republic, By that time the government had also secured 
diplomatic recognition from Btitain and the United States, mainly due 
to Mannerheim's efforts. 40 With these measures, Finland was finally 
established as an independent nation, 
38 Shearman, pp. 65-67. 
39 Meade, pp, 150-151, 
40 Wuorinen, pp. 261-266. 
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The most perplexing problem facing Finland from 1918 to 1939 was 
its relationship to Russia. The problem was initially aggrevated by 
the Finnish desire to expand east into Karelia. The Karelians were 
closely related ethnically and culturally to the Finns; this expansion 
would also make Finland's borders shorter and easier to defend. During 
the Russian Civil War, Mannerheim proposed that Finland would help the 
anti-Communist forces take Petrograd in exchange for a guarantee of 
independence from the White Russians and Finnish expansion into eastern 
Karelia. The Whites unwisely declined this bargain at a time when 
Finnish aid would have meant the fall of Petrograd and possibly the 
41 
collapse of the Bolshevik state. 
By 1920, when the Soviet government had clearly defeated the 
Whites, the Finns decid1¥ to come to terms with it. Questions over 
~oundaries, debts, commercial activities, .etc. remained, despite the 
recognition of Finland in 1918. The Treaty of Tartu was signed on 
October 14, 1920. It defined the boundary of Ftnland, transferred the 
provinces of Repola and Porajaervi from Finland to Russia, and defined 
some commercial, financial, and industrial interests common to both 
Finland and Russia. 42 
Finnish foreign relations from 1920 to 1939 were dominated by the 
necessity to co-exist with its gigantic eastern neighbor. This problem 
overshadowed all other aspects of Finland's diplomatic policy. 
Generally, Finland managed to maintain peaceful, if not friendly, 
41 Shearman, pp. 71-72. 
42 . . 
---Wuorinen, pp. 485-491. 
relations with the Soviet Union. A series of treaties and agreements 
between the two countries regulated various connnercial and industrial 
enterprises in which both nations participated, such as fishing, fur 
trapping, lumber, and setting up connnissions to arbitrate disputes. 43 
21 
However, several issues did arise between the Finns and Russians which 
poisoned relations and at times brought them to the brink of war. 
A minor source of irritation to the Finns was the activities of 
Finnish Connnunists who had fled to Russia after the civil war. Men like 
Otto Kuusinen, who had been the revolutionary Commissar for Public 
Education, slipped back and forth across the border on missions of 
revolutionary espionage, often pursued by the Central Criminal Depart-
ment of Finland. 44 This problem, hwoever, was only minor and ceased to 
exist within a few years after the war as the Finnish government gained 
stability. 
During the early 1920's, the major sources of friction between 
Finland and the Soviet Union were the Aaland Islands and eastern 
Karelia. In both cases the situation was aggrevated by Finnish appeals 
to the League of Nations. Finland belonged to the League, but the 
Soviet Union consistently held that the League had no authority. 
The question over the Aaland Islands arose when the League of 
Nations undertook, at Swedish request, to guarantee the neutrality of 
the islands. Despite the distance of the islands from Russia, the 
Soviet government apparently saw some threat in the action of the League, 
43Robert M. Slusser and Jan F. Triska, A Calendar of Soviet Treaties: 
1917-1957 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959)-,-PP• 476-480. 
44 Meade, p. 152. 
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possibly stemming from the fact that many of the League countries had 
been those who had intervened in the Russian civil war on the side of 
the Whites. At the beginning of the discussions, the Soviet Union 
announced that no decision concerning the islands would be valid if the 
Russians did not take part. 45 Along the same lines, Soviet leaders 
warned that while they would not intervene as long as the islands 
belong to Finland, Russia must be consulted if their status was to 
be changed. 46 When the League of Nations formulated its decision to 
neutralize the· Aaland Islands but leave them under Finnish administra-
tion', the Soviet Unien denounced the League for conspiring against 
Russia, rejected the authority of the world body to draft such an agree-
ment, and refused to recognize the validity of the convention. 47 
Fortunately, the Soviet Union cho~e not to go to the extreme of annexing 
the islands; the entire protest s~ems· to have been largely a matter of 
fear that the League of Nations was planning new operations against 
Russia. Having lodged its protest, the Russian government was content 
to wait for further developments; the fact that it had been waging a 
de facto war against several League members was a contributing factor 
to the Russian fears. 
If the Soviet reaction to the Aaland Islands question was in pro-
test to the League of Nations rather than Finland, the dispute over 
45Note from Chicherin to the Allied, Swedish, and Finnish govern-
ments on the Aaland Islands, June 28, 1921, Soviet Documents£'!!. Foreign 
Policy, Vol. I, p. 190. 
46Note from Chicherin to Sweden and Finland on the Aaland Islands, 
July 22, 1921, ibid., p. 251. 
47Narkomindel statement on the convention on the neutrality of the 
Aaland Islands, November 16, 1921, ibid., pp, 278-280. 
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eastern Karelia was much different. An uprising in Karelia in 1921 
caused a large number of Finns to cross the border and fight against 
the Soviet Union. The rebellion was put down, but relations between 
Finland and Russia were worsened. The Russian protest against Finnish 
bands of volunteers helping the insurgents also demanded that the 
border between Finland and Karelia be closed until the uprising was 
crushed. The Finnish plea for a League of Nations investigation was 
rejected by the Soviets, and their;note also contained an implied threat 
48 
against Finland if further aid was sent to the rebels. When the 
Finnish government managed to place the Karelian issue before the League 
of Nations, the Soviets replied that the League had no authority to 
49 
act. The Finns regarded themselves as the protectors of the Karelians; 
the Soviet Union regarded Finland as an imperialistic state eager to 
expand at Russia's expense. A later attempt by the Finns to again 
involve the League of Nations brought a Russian accusation that the 
Finns were"in violation of the Treaty of Tartu by so acting.so The 
Soviet Union also rejected Finnish attempts to bring the matter before 
the Permanent Court of International Justice, again saying that only 
R . h d h · · h 51 uss1a a any aut or1ty 1n t e matter. The issue was never 
48Note from Chicherin to the Finnish Charge' d' Affairs in Moscow on 
eastern Karelia, December 5, 1921, ibid., pp. 280~282. 
49Narkomindel statement 6n the League of Nations resolution on the 
Karelian question, January 18, 1922, ibid., p. 288. · 
50Note from Chicherin to the Finnish envoy in Moscow on eastern 
Karelia, February 17, 1923, ibid., p. 374. 
51Reply from Chicherin to the Secretary of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice, June 2, 1923, ibid,, pp. 398-399. 
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successfully resolved and remained a point of disagreement between the 
two countries until the Second World War. 
While other problems arose between the two nations, they were 
generally of a minor nature and were settled without trouble. Yet, 
there persisted one ~onsideration which remained a source of anxiety 
for the Russians. The·position of Firiland, along with Estonia, Latvia, 
and Lithuania, constituted a threat to the Soviet Union. This concern 
may well have prompted the Moscow Disarmament Conference between Russia, 
Estonia, Latvia, Poland, and Finland in 1922. Fear of Russia prevented 
. 52 
any agreement from taking plac.e, however. A thaw between Russia and 
Finland occurred in 1926 when representatives of both nations met.to 
discuss the Aaland Islands and settlement of dlsputes. Little was 
decided at this time, but the door was left open for further discus-
53 
sion. A dangerous lack of understanding between the two nations 
persisted into the early 1930 's ,' however, as evidenced by the Soviet 
belief that the Finnish government was responsible for the anti-Russian 
54 
election posters and newspaper items which frequently appeared. The 
Finns, for their part, generally exhibited disinterest in Russia and 
often contempt for Russians. 
52titvinov' s statement in reply to the collectiver stat"eme·nt .of 
Polish, Finnish; Estonfani;· ·and tatvian:"delegation to the Moscow 
Disarmament Conference',_ December·· 12, 1927, - ibid, ; . pp. 351-353. 
53 Note from the Soviet Envoy in Helsinki to the Finnish Foreign 
Minister on the proposed guarantee pact, July 12, 1926, ibid., Vol. II, 
pp. 123-124. 
54 Tass statement on settlement of questions in dispute with Finland, 
January 28, 1931, ibid •. , pp. 469-470. 
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Despite the nervousness of the Russians about Finland, relations 
between the two countries were not uncordial from 1926 to 1938. As 
Germany began to rearm, Russia began to have new worries. Stalin 
remembered only too well that German troops had landed at Hangoe in 
1918 and had been in a position to strike at Petrograd or cut the rail-
road linking Murmansk with the rest of Russia. Nor had Stalin forgotten 
the British naval raids on Russian ports during the Civil War. Conse-
quently, in order to safeguard their northwestern flank, the Russians 
began to pressure Finland into a mutual assistance pact in 1939 in 
addition to the non-aggression agreements in 1932 and 1938. The Finns 
rejected the proposal as an attempt to put Finland under Soviet con~ 
55 trol. This refusal caused the Russians to grow more suspicious of 
Finland. 
The approach of war in Europe caused the Soviet Union to become 
even more wary of Finland. As Germany became more belligerant, the 
close economic ties between German and Finnish industries prompted 
Russian concern over a possible alliance between the two countries. The 
proximity of the Karelian Isthmus to Leningrad was a major anxiety for 
the Soviet Union. The possibility of a German thrust through Finland 
into Russia seems to have been considered more seriously than an 
attack through Poland and eastern Europe. The fact that diplomatic 
relations between Germany and Finland had been rather cold since the 
coming of Hitler and that Finnish press was sharply critical of the 
Third Reich does not seem to have made an impression on the Kremlin. 
55 Shearman, p. 87. 
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Russia saw a threat in Finland and determined to eliminate that threat 
as soon as possible. 
CHAPTER II 
THE WINTER WAR 
After Germany annexed the remnant of Czechoslovakia in March, 
1939, war in Europe became even more likely. As France and Great 
Britain began to stiffen their resistance to further German expansion, 
a situation developed which was to involve,Finland in an almost fatal 
struggle with Russia. The Finns wished to avoid an alliance with any 
of the major powers but were being pressured by the Russians to :accept 
a mutual assistance treaty in the .event of an attack by a third power. 
The Finnish government refused the Russian offer, choosing to issue a 
proclamation of neutrality instead. 
Unfortunately, an event occurred which wpuld ultimately force 
Finland into war. On August 23, 1939, Germany and the Soviet Union 
signed an agreement not to attack each other. Germany's aim was to 
avoid interference by Russia when Hitler's armies attacked Poland. If 
war did start, the Soviet .Union wished to see it waged between Germany, 
France, and the United Kingdom rather than between Russia and Germany. 
In this way, all three of the aforementioned nations would be weakened 
and the position of the Soviet Union strengthened.1 Appended to this 
treaty was a secret protocol which meant trouble for Finland and the 
Baltic states. The agreement divided Poland and defined German and 
1wuorinen, A History of Finland, p. 88. 
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Soviet spheres of influence. The dividing line was originally the 
northern border of Lithuania; Germany declared that it had no interest 
in Estonia, Latvia, and Finland since they were recognized as being in 
the Soviet sphere of influence. 2 Lithuania was later assigned to the 
Russian zone in exchange for Polish territory to Germany. 
With the assurance of a free hand, the Soviet Union turned its 
attention to the Bal~ic states--Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. Shortly 
after the German invasion of Poland, the Russians set forth demands to 
these nations for the use of certain ports, airfields, and military 
installations for the duration of the war, while their governments were 
to supply the Soviet ground, naval, and air forces occupying these 
areas. While the Baltic nations were reluctant to accept these condi-
tions, Soviet quress, which amounted to threat of invasion if the terms 
were not met, forced them to agree. Estonia signed an agreetnent on 
September 25, 1939, followed by Latvia on October 5, and Lithuania on 
3 October 11. The Soviet Union, for its part, pledged not to infringe 
on the economic or political affairs of the nations involved; the 
sincerity of this promise was subsequently demonstrated in 1940 when 
all three nations were annexed by the Soviet Union. The concession 
forced from the Baltic states in September and October of 1939 insured 
that Russia could take them whenever such action seemed desirable. 
2Treaty of Non-Aggression between Germany and the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics, August 23, 1939, U. S. Department of State, Docu-
ments£!!. German Foreign Policy (Ser. D, Washington: Government Printing 
Office, 1956-57), Vol. VII, pp. 245-247. 
3The Times (London, October 14, 1939), p. 9. 
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The meaning of what was happening was not lost on Finland. The 
Finns were suspicious from the start that there might be some kind of 
secl;'et agreement which would be harmful to Finland, Already in August, 
Eljas Erkko, the Finnish Foreign Minister, had voiced his fears that 
Germany might have divided the Baltic area with Russia. Erkko was also 
keenly aware that without.Germany to be concerned about, the Soviet 
Union would feel free to take action against Finland. When confronted 
by these Finnish suspicions, the Germans responded in an evasive and 
' 1 4 noncommita manner. 
When these Baltic states were forced to accept the Russian agree-
ment, the Finns realized that Russia would probably make similar pro-
posals to them. Despite Soviet promises to honor t.he political 
sovereignty of these countries, the Finns believed that all three would 
soon be swallowed by Russia, On October 9, 1939, a Finnish representa-
tive, Juko Paasikivi, was sent to,Moscow at Soviet request to discuss a 
number of unspecified items of importance to both Finland and Russia. 
Negotiations began in Moscow on October 12. The Finns were repre-
sented by Paasikivi, A. S. Yrjo-Koskinen, Johan Nykopp, and Aladar 
Paasonen; on the Soviet side, the delegation consisted of Stalin, 
Molotov, V. P, Potemkin, and Vladimir Derevuanski, 5 The Soviet pro-
posals were far reaching. They demanded the lease of the i;jort of Hangoe 
for a Soviet naval base, the right to use anchorages in Lappohja Bay, 
the destruction of all fortifications on both sides of the Finnish-Soviet 
4 Bluecher to Grundherr, August 26, 193.9, Documents on German Foreign 
Policy, Ser. D, Vol, VII, pp. 343-345. 
5 Vasinoe Tanner,~ Winter War (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1957), p. 25, 
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border, the relocation of the Karelian Isthmus border to a point 
seventy kilometers from Leningrad, and a non,aggression treaty between 
Finland and the Soviet Union. 6 In return, the Soviet Union agreed to 
cede the provinces of Repola and Porajaervi from Soviet Karelia to 
Finland. The Russians were thus willing to exchange 5,529 square 
kilometers of land for 2,761 square kilometers of Finnish territory, 
which was also to include the islands of Suursaari, Tytaerssari, and 
Koivisto in the Gulf of Finland. 7 The Russian demands were clearly 
designed to achieve greater security for Leningrad and Murmansk. At. 
this point in the negotiations, Stalin and Molotov maintained a rather 
benevolent demeanor toward the Finns and, unlike their treatment of 
Estonia, Latvia; and Lithuania, made no threats, direct or indirect, 
~gainst Finland if it. refused. The Finnish delegates returned to 
Helsinki on October 16 to present the Soviet demands to the Finnish 
government. 
A select committee of the Finnish Council of State met on October 
16 to consider the Russian proposals. Present were Prime Minister A. K. 
Cajander, Foreign Minister Erkko, Defense Minister Juko Niukkanen, 
Vaeinoe Tanner (a member of the Cabinet foreign affairs committee and 
later Foreign Minister), Field Marshal Mannerheim, Lieutenant General 
Hugo Oestermann, Lieutenant General Lenhart Oesch, Paasikivi, and the 
other members of the delegation to Moscow. The consensus of those 
6Hellmuth Guenther Dahms, Geschichte . des Zweiten Wel tkriegs 
(Tuebingen: Rainier Wunderlich Verlag Herman Leins, 1965), p. 94. 
7Memorandum of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialists Re-
publics handed.in Moscow on October 14, 1939, by M. M, Stalin and Molotov 
to M. Paasikivi, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, The Finnish 
Blue Book (New York: J, B. Lippincott Company, 1940), pp. 49-51 4 
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present was that the Russian demands should be rejected. The cession of 
Hangoe was deemed impossible, since this strategic port.could be used 
as a base for an assault of Helsinki from the west at the same.time a 
general attack on Finland came from the east. Some minor adjustments 
of the Karelian border might be open to discussion, they agreed, but 
the frontier could not safely be.changed to the extent desired by the 
Soviet Union. The, cession of the islands asked by Russia constituted 
no threat to Finland and should be discussed further. 8 No mention was 
made of the Soviet offer of Repola and Porajaervi to balance the loss 
of Finnish territory. These provinces were ·of little value compared to 
what Finland would be giving up·in.terms of military, industrial, and 
commercial potential. Also, in..the years from 1920 to 1939, Repola and 
Porajaervi had been colonized with Russians who might possibly consti-
tute a threat to Finland's safety. 9 With this reply and counter-offer 
to Russia, Paasikivi and Tanner returned to Moscow on October 23. 
In this first stage of negotiations the limits had been set; 
neither side deviated far from its original position. St~lin wanted 
Hangoe, part of the Karelian Isthmus, and some islands in.the Gulf of 
Finland in order tQ increase the security of Leningrad. He was willing 
to give up two provinces of little value and make a few other minor 
concessions. The Finns regarded Hangoe in foreign hands as a permanent 
threat to Helsinki. To give up a large part of the Karelian Isthmus 
would be to give_up territory containing an important part of Finnish 
8 Tanner, pp. 31-35. · 
9Borenius, p. 256. 
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industry; it would also mean that the border in that area would be twice 
as long and much harder to defend. The islands, except for Koivisto, 
were of little importartce to Finland and could be given to Russia. 
The journey of Paasikivi and Tanner to Moscow was futile. The 
Soviet Union refused to change its original proposals in anything save 
a few unimportant details; the proposed Russian garrison in Hangoe was 
reduced to four thousand instead of five thousand troops, for example. 
The adjustment of the Karelian Isthmus boundary was altered slightly but 
,, 
not enough to be a genuine compromise. The Soviet Union rejected the 
Finnish terms as unacceptable, and the Finnish delegates announced that 
Finland could not acced~ to the Russian demands. Paasikivi and Tanner 
1 f M b 24 d d ' 1 'k' h ' h lO et oscow on Octo er an arrive in He sin ion t e,twenty-sixt • 
On November 3, Tanner and Paasikivi returned to Moscow for the last 
time to present their final proposals: Hangoe and the Lappohja Bay 
anchorage must remain under Finnish control; the government of Finland 
was willing to give the Soviet Union several islands in the Gulf of 
Finland in exchange for territorial compensaion in Soviet Karelia; the 
border on the Karelian Isthmus might be relocated out of artillery range 
fL ' dll o eningra • The Soviet government declared these terms to be 
unsatisfactory. Hangoe had become an integral·part of the Russian 
defense plans, and the Russians refused to consider any plan which did 
not cede the city to them. 
10 Tanner, pp, 39-45. 
11Memorandum of the Finnish Government handed in Moscow on November 
3, 1939, by M. M. Patlsikivi and Tanner to M. Molotov, Commisar for 
Foreign Affairs, The Finnish Blue Book, pp. 61-66. 
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The Finnish delegates remained in Moscow until November 13, accom-
plishing nothing. As they departed, the Soviet press and radio launched 
a campaign of abuse against the Finnish government, labelling it.an 
organ of warmongers and capitalists. There were hints that Russia 
would impose its will on Finland by force if necessary. Before they 
departed, the Finns sent a letter to Moloto~ expressing the hope that it 
would be possible to hold further negotiations, but this effort proved 
12 
no more tha~ an idle gesture. 
The Finns had not been idle at home during the negotiations in 
Moscow. On October 5, the very day upon which the Russians had requested 
that a delegation be sent to Moscow, frontier elements of the Finnish 
army were mobilized. 13 Mobilization continued at a ;apid pace and was 
completed by October 19. Troops.were sent to various positions along 
14 the Soviet-Finnish border. The Council of State agreed to raise 500 
million marks from the Finnish people for defense purposes, and the 
population subscribed a loan of 700 ~illion marks. ln addition, private 
industries and individuals began to contribute to the common defense. 
Some people were content to coll~ct winter clothing for the army; some. 
businesses continued to pay employees who were absent because of duty 
with the reserves. When Tanner and Paasikivi left Helsinki for Moscow 
on October 21, their train.was delayed a number of times by troops 
15 
moving into defense positions. The Finns had 300,000 men under arms, 
12 Tanner, pp. 79-80. 
13 Bluecher to Weizsaecher, October 6, 1939, Documents .Q.!l German 
Foreign Policy, Ser. D, Vol. VIII, p. 231. 
14 Bluecher to Weizsaecher, October 19, 1939, ibid., p. 319. 
15 Tanner, pp. 35-36. 
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including both regular army and reserves, by the time mobilization was 
completed, and the Finnish fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus were 
hastily finished. As much war material as possible was purchased from 
16 foreign sources, mainly Sweden and England, and air raid shelters were 
d . h . . 17 ug int e cities. In addition to the men under arms, Finland also 
' 
mobilized its women's auxiliary, the Lotta Svaerd organization. '):his 
group of women raised Finland's total number of defense personnel to 
375,000. 
Yet, what were the chances for Finland's survival if war actually 
broke out? To those best informed, the prospects seemed dim indeed. 
Field Marshal Mannerheim, whose requests for a higher arms budget had 
been denied several times in the past, held that Finland would exhaust 
its supply of ammunition in two weeks; it followed that the war could 
last no more than a montlL Though Defense Minister Niukkanen was 
comparatively optimistic, he conceded that Finland could last but six 
18 
months at the most. The Finns were willing to fight Russia to preserve 
their freedom; the question was whether the Finnish army, with 375,000 
men and women and ninety-six airplanes, could withstand the onslaught 
of the millions of men and thousands of airplanes that the Soviet Union 
could throw against them. Given these hopeless odds, the military 
leaders of Finland advised the government to come to terms with Russia. 
16some material was also purchased from Italy but was halted in 
transit through German territory. 
17 Geoffrey Cox, The Red Army Moves (London: Victor Gollancy Limited, 
1941) , p. 28 . 
18 Tanner, p. 51. 
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Finland attempted to obtain aid from other nations. Sweden and 
the other Scandinavia countries were the first choices. Norway felt 
that it was far enough away from the Soviet Union that there was no 
need to become involved; Denmark was afraid of Germany. Sweden seems 
to have favored the idea of helping the Finns but turned against the 
idea when Germany failed the guarantee that it would not inFerfere if 
Sweden cooperated with Finland against Russia. Finnish attempts to 
obtain German mediation were rejected by Berlin as being contrary to 
19 the German-Soviet agreement. Attempts by the various Scandinavian 
governments and the United States to act as arbitrators were rejected 
by the Soviet Union. Russia, having failed to ootain her demands of 
diplomacy, was ready to turn to other methods. 
On November 26, 1939, Molotov accused the Finnish forces in the 
Karelian Isthmus of attacking Soviet troops, His statement alleged 
that the Finns had fired seven artillery rounds at Soviet forces sta-
tioned near the village of Mainila, killing four and wounding nine. 
Molotov further declared that the concentration of Finnish forces in 
the Isthmus constituted a threat to Leningrad and demanded that the 
Finnish government withdraw its troops twenty-five kilometers from the 
20 border, 
On November 27, Finland denied that; they had fired on any Russian 
tro_ops on the grounds that there was no Finnish artillery in the 
vicinity of Mainila of the type ;hat had been supposedly fired, The 
19weizsaecher to Blueche~, October 12, 1939, Documents on German 
Foreign Policy, Ser D, Vol. VIII, p. 267, 
20Note from Molotov to the Finnish Minister in Moscow, November 26, 
1939, Soviet Documents £E:. Foreign, Policy, Vol, III, p, 401. 
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Finnish reply further stated that the only cannon fired on the twenty-
sixth had been on the Soviet side of the border, The Finns rejected 
as unnecessary th~ demand that their troops be withdrawn from the 
frontier and asked that a joint inquiry· be made.into the incident to 
21 
clear it up. 
On the twenty-eighth, Molotov declared that the denial of the 
attack on Soviet troops near Mainila, along with the continued concen~ 
tration of Finnish troops in the Karelian Isthmus, constituted a breach 
of the Finno-Soviet Non-Aggression Treaty of 1932, and that consequently 
the Soviet Union considered itself released from that treaty. On 
November 29, the Soviet Union aceused Finland of further attacks on 
Russian troops, denounced the Finnish govermnent as imperialistic, and 
broke off diplomatic relations. 22 
The accusations made by the Russians agains the Finns on the 
occasion of the Mainila incident seem far-fetched. The Finnish govern-
ment knew it .could not win a war against the Soviet Union without 
foreign assistance. It also realized there would be no such foreign 
assistance. Therefore, the last thing that the Finnish govermnent 
' 
would do would be to order such a provocation. There were no substan-
tial troop concentrations near Mainila. To withdraw from the Isthmus 
fortifications in the face of the Soviet troops which had been 
marshalled in the area since September would have been suicidal for the 
21 . 
Expose of M. Holsti, Delegate of Finland to the League of Nations, 
presented at the Session of the Assembly of the League of Nations on 
December 11, 1939, The Finnish Blue Book, pp, 89-94. 
22Note from Molotov to the Finnish Minister in Moscow, November 29, 
1939, Soviet Documents£!!. Foreign Policy, Vol, III, pp. 402-403. 
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Finns. Finally, the Finns were still hoping that the dispute between 
Finland and the Soviet Union could be settled through diplomatic 
channels; to engage in a series of planned attacks would destroy this 
hope. 
On November 30, the Soviet Union launched air, sea, and land 
assaults on Finland. Helsinki, Lahti, Kotka, Enso, Kittilae, and the 
Petsamo area were bombed, with considerable civilian losses. The Soviet 
battleships Oktoboskaja Rovuluzja and Marat; along with the heavy 
cruiser Kirov and several destroyers, attacked Hangoe and Vyborg. 
Soviet strength on the ground has been estimated at 500,000 men and 
23 1, 000 tanks, supported by 2, 500 planes. · 
On December 2, 1939, the Soviet Union created a puppet government 
in exile with the intention of discrediting the legitimate Finnish 
regime. Russia's leaders selected Otto Kuusinen, a member of the 
Finnish Revolutionary Cabinet of 1918, to head the Democratic Republic 
of Finland to replace the Finnish government which had refused to 
cooperate with Russia. In addition, it pledged military aid to 
Kuusinen and resolved to eliminate the "former plutocratic government 
in Finland". The Democratic Republic agreed to all the demands which 
the Soviet Union had originally presented to Tanner and Paasikivi; in 
return, Russia promised to transfer about 70,000 square kilometers of 
Soviet Karelia to Finland and maintain a· posture of noninterference in 
future.Finnish affairs. 24 
23 Dahms, pp. 95-98. 
24Treaty of Mutual Assistance and Friendship between the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics and the Democratic Republic of Finland; 
December 2, 1939, Soviet Documents .QE. Foreign Policy, Vol. III, pp. 407-
409. 
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The motives behind the Soviet decision to go to war and to form 
the Kuusinen government are fairly simple, Finland had refused to 
agree to the Soviet demands; thus, Leningrad was still in jeopardy, 
After the failure of Stalin. and Molotov to reach an agreement with 
Paasikivi and Tanner, the Soviet Union had decided that ~orce would 
be necessary. The propaganda barrage by the Soviet news service and 
the border incidents had been designed to pave the way by making it 
appear that Finland was guilty of wanting war. At the same time, roads 
were constructed through formerly impassible terrain in Soviet Karelia 
25 
and troops were brought up. The process of creating the Kuusinen 
government had begun in mid-November when Stalin became convinced that 
the negotiations would fail to achieve the results he desired, making 
26 the use of the Red army necessary, The role of the Kuusinen regime 
was to give legitimacy to the Soviet invasion on the grounds that the 
Russians had been invited into Finland by a friendly government. Also, 
Stalin believed that he could draw Finnish workers to his side by this 
device. Kuusinen seems to have shared this illusion, remembering only 
the events of 1918 and never thinking that conditions could have 
27 
changed. 
In Finland, however, conditions in 1939,were considerably 
different fbom those in 1918. Great programs of social reforms and 
labor legislation had been inaugurated, and the causes of the 1918 
25John H. Wuorinen, Finland and World~.!.!.= 1939-1944 (New York: 
The Roland Press Company, 1948), p, 64. 
26 Tanner, pp. 104-105. 
27 Borenius, p, 261. 
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civil war had largely been eliminated. 28 To the Finns, therefore, the 
creation of the Democratic Republic of Finland seemed nothing more 
than a cynical maneuver to bring Finland under complete Soviet control. 
When the news of the Kuusinen government became known in Finland, the 
Finnish Social Democratic Party and the Finnish Confederation of Trade 
Unions jointly declared that although the working classes of the country 
wanted peace, they would fight to the death to preserve Finnish inde-
pendence. In the words of Karl-August Fagerholm of the Finnish news-
paper Arbetarbladet, "O. W. Kuusinen's government is a complete 
failure; its propaganda value is nil. 1129 The apparent intent of Russia 
in setting up the Kuusinen government, combined with the impact from 
the civilian losses resulting from the Russian bombing of Helsinki, 
united all Finns and fired them with a determination never·· to surrender. 
The Cajander captnet resigned, but although the new cabinet under Risto 
Ryti was more willing to negotiate.even on points like Hangoe, it 
refused to give up the freedom of Finland. 
The Russian attack was three pronged: a drive against Petsamo, 
an attempt to drive across the center of Finland to the Gulf of Bothnia 
and cut the country in half, and finally an attack through the Karelian 
Isthmus toward Vyborg. The Russian military leaders planned on a short 
war. The morale of the Finns would break before the onslaught of the 
Red army, they believed;·within a week all of Finland would be under 
the control of Kuusinen. The weather was not considered an important 
28 Wuorinen, A History of Finland, pp. 329-336. 
29Quoted in.Tanner, p. 106. 
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30 factor because of the short time that the conquest would take. The 
first day of the war seemed to confirm Soviet expectations, as Soviet 
divisions drove forward, opposed by handfuls of Finnish troops. In 
one place, a single Finnish battalian fought a delaying action against 
an entire division in a series of fighting withdrawals. Petsamo was 
completely overrun in the first few days of the war and held by the 
Russians until its end. 
Within a few days, however, the Soviet advance had been halted. 
The Finnish government asked for a renewal of negotiations on December 
4, but the Soviet Union rejected the request 3 replying that they did 
not recognize the Ryti government as the legal government of Finland, 
By December 5, the Red army, although slowed by increasing Finnish 
resistance, was still advancing, and Stalin still expected an early 
vic~ory. 31 By December 17, however, the Soviet attacks had been 
stalled. Russian armor was stopped in the Karelian Isthmus at the 
forward Finnish positions. In the center of Finland, the Russian 
advance was halted by Finnish victories at Tolvajaervi on December 11 
and Suomussalmi on December 15, Another Soviet drive was held at 
Aeglaejaervi. On December 24, Finnish raiding parties crossed into 
Russian Karelia. The Russian air force, on the other hand, continued 
32 
to hannner at Finnish troop positions and the civilian population. 
30David J, Dallin, Soviet Russia's Foreign Policy: i939-1942, 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1942), pp. 141-142. 
31i,;i-eizsaecker to _Legations in Sweden and Finland, December 5, 1939, 
Documents£!!_ German Foreign Policy, Ser, D, Vol. VIII, pp. 486-488, 
32B . oren1us, pp, 264-265. 
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Russian reverses continued until February, when Soviet troops 
broke through Finnish defenses in the Karelian Isthmus. By the end of 
1939, the Finns had shot down 150 Russian planes and destroyed four 
hundred tanks. At Suomussalmi, the Russian 163rd Division was destroyed 
after a three-week battle. By January 8, 1940, the 44th Division had 
also been shattered at Suomussalmi, The climax of Finnish victories 
north of Lake Lodoga came in February when they annihilated the 18th 
Division at Syskyjaervi; by February 18, this division had lost 18,000 
men. After a battle that lasted a month, the 34th Moscow Tank Brigade 
33 
was destroyed on March 1. The destruction of these two units was no 
more than a sideshow, however, because of the Russian breakthrough in 
the Karelian Isthmus. 34 
How was:it possible for Finland to win such spectacular victories 
during this part of the war? Part of the reason lies in the inept 
handling of the war by Moscow. First of all, most of the troops used 
were of inferior quality, sent to Finland in the expectation of 
occupying a nation that would receive them gladly, A second important 
reason is that the Red army was not prepared for a war in Finland, The 
Russians had not prepared for a war in Finland, The Russians had 
developed a splendid force for operations on the plains of central and 
eastern Europe, but it was not an army which could be used effectively 
in the terrain found in Finland. The Soviet troops were not properly 
equipped or clothed for a war in which temperatures dropped to thirty 
• 
33Ibid., pp. 266-269. 
341 dd' ' h 54 h D' . . ' 1 d d d d n a 1t1on, t e t 1v1s1on was encirc e an escape estruc-
tion only because the war ended. 
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below zero. The dark colored uniforms worn by the Russian soldiers 
were suited for weather in the Ukraine and Poland, not for the Finnish 
winter. Tanks were of little value in the forests of Finland, where 
there was no room to maneuver and the roads and clearings were mined. 
Also tanks were often disabled by mechanical problems caused by the 
intense cold. The Russians had no effective reconnaissance, since 
planes we~e often grounded by weather or were unable to spot movements 
of Finnish troops because of low clouds or thick forests. Within the 
forests, visibility was frequently limited to fifty meters or less. 
Another major failing of the Russian army was its command system. In 
every regimental or divisional unit, besides the commanding officer, a 
political commissar kept watch over the loyalty of the officers and the 
morale of the men; in many cases, the commissar could overrule the 
commander. This system was not conoucive to an effective strategy, 
since it inhibited initiative and could cause an officer to have second 
thoughts about any action he took. Finally, because of the purges in 
the Red army during the 1930's, many commanders hesitated to act without 
k . h 0 h h d f O O 35 as ing ig er ea quarters or instructions. 
On the other hand, the Finnish army proved itself to be a superb 
fighting machine. Finnish terrain constituted a great obstacle ~o any 
enemy advance, and the Finns made maximum use of this fact in fighting 
the Russians. They were expert in the use of land mines. The so-called 
Mannerheim Line, a collection of pillboxes, mine fields, machine gun 
emplacements, and trenches, held up the Russian advance on the Karelian 
Isthmus for three months. North of Lake Ladoga, the Finns utilized 
35 Cox, pp. 236-242. 
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another form of attack--ski troops--which brought disaster to the 
Russians at Suomussalmi, Tolvajaervi, and Syskyjaervi. While the Finns 
had little equipment in the way of artillery, aircraft, or anti-tank 
guns, their ski-borne infantry, clothed in white and armed with sub-
machine guns and rifles, destroyed thousands of Russian troops and 
captured tons of Russian material. The Finnish army was a well organized, 
disciplined, and highly motivated group of men. They were dedicated to 
Finnish independence and had a courage which came from a belief that 
they were in the right. 36 
Despite the Finnish victories and the Soviet losses in personnel 
and equipment, Finland could not hope to win the war. Whie the Soviet 
Union had lost several times more men than Finland had, the Finns lost a 
far greater percentage of their available manpower. Despite purchases 
of anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns, machine guns, airplanes, and other 
war material from England, Sweden, and France, the Finnish army could 
not compete with the Red army as far as quantity of arms was concerned. 
The losses sustained by the Finnish army could not be replaced. The 
8,000 Swedes and 3,500 Norwegians, Danes, Dutch, Irish, Canadians, and 
Americans who volunteered to serve with the Finns were not sufficient 
to alter the balance. 37 Consequently, when the Russians resumed their 
offensive in the Karelian Istlunus in February, 1940, the Finns did not 
have the manpower to hold them. 
36 Ibid., pp. 253-255. 
37 Daluns, PP• 98-101. 
44 
Still, by January, 1940, Russia was in a difficult position •. Her 
troops had been defeated, and the Finns had overwhelmingly rejected 
Kuusinen. The Finns were ready to negotiate a settlement and were even 
willing to discuss Hangoe,.but because of Soviet defeats and the conse-
quent damage to Soviet prestige, Stalin could not consider negotia-
tions.38 Instead, better troops were sent to Finland, and the army was 
reorganized. Among other c~anges, the system of political commissars 
was abolished. General Semjon Timoschenko, in command of Soviet forces 
on the Karelian Isthmus, was given more troops and ordered to break 
through the Finnish lines. 
On February 4, after a tremendous artillery barrage, the battle of 
Summa began. Thousands of Russian troops, supported by tanks, air-
craft, and artillery, attacked this small coastal village at the west 
end of the Mannerheim Line. The terrain in this area was less of a 
barrier than north of Lake Ladoga or further east on the Isthmus. The 
first attacks were repulsed as the Russians lost hundreds of men and 
about fifty tanks. Timoschenko then attac~ed with three division on an 
eight-kilometer front, 39 By February 12, 1940, the Soviet troops had 
forced the Finns back about fifteen kilometers to their second-line 
positions. The Finnish island of Koivisto, with its 305 mm coast 
defense guns, was able to hold out for nearly two weeks, but by the end 
of the battle for Summa, Finland had been forced to commit the last of 
. 40 
its reserves. 
38Frohwein to Weizsaecker, January 19, 1940,. Documents .2.£ German 
Foreign Policy, Ser. D, Vol •. VIII, pp. 685-688. 
39one division generally attacks on a front of five to ten kilometers. 
40The Times (London; February 15, 1940), p. 9. 
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With the loss of Summa and th~ continued attacks against Finnish 
positions, the Finnish government was faced with a different decision: 
to continue fighting, or to make peace on the best terms they could 
secure, While Foreign Minister Tanner had been in tou~h with Moscow 
through the mediation of Stockholm since January 29, the Russian demands 
had not changed except that they no longer offered any guarantee of 
t . 41 compensa ion. The Finnish government had three choices. They could 
continue to fight.on alone, although there was no hope of victory; the 
end result would be the destruction of the Finnish nation and virtual 
extermination of the Finnish people. Secondly, Finland could appeal 
for foreign intervention. While Norway and Sweden had refused to 
become directly involved in the war:, France and Great Britain offered 
to send an expeditionary force of 50,000 men to be followed by a larger 
force latero There were two drawbacks to the plan. First of all, only 
about.15,000 could reach Finland before April, and this number would be 
of little value in the present crisis. Secondly, such an action by 
France and England would bring Germany into the war and turn 
Scandinavia into a battleground for the major powers. Hitler had 
clearly stated that the German army would invade Sweden if she allowed 
Allied troops to pass through Swedish territory. Consequently, the 
Finns rejected the idea of getting help from France and Great Britain. 42 
Finally, the Finns could capitulate. The terms would be harsh, but the 
Finnish state would be pr~served. 
41 Tanner, pp. 125-126. 
42Georg Achates Gripenberg, Finland and the Great Powers (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1965), pp. 115-138. 
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The decision was a hard one to make. Most Finns did not want to 
give up, as the considerable debate in the Diet revealed, The continued 
advance of the Red army was the deciding factor. Koivisto fell on 
February 23; by March 8, the Soviet 29th and 33rd Divisions were 
attacking Vy.borg. In addition, ski troops had been brought from 
Siberia and were making raids into the northern and central sections of 
Finland. As these events materialized, Mannerheim advised Ryti and 
Tanner to secure peace on the best possible terms available. 43 
On March 6, a Finnish delegation, consisting of Prime Minister 
Ryti, Paasikivi, Major General Rudoff Walden, and Vaeinoe Voionmaa 
arrived in Moscow to consider the Russian demands which had been 
stiffened since the negotiations of October and November. The border 
adjustments on the Karelian Isthmus included Vyborg; in addition, large 
tracts of territory in the center of Finland were to be ceded to 
Russia. These new concessions included some of the most important 
industrial centers of Finland. However, the impending collapse of the 
Finnish army near Vyborg left the delegation with no choice. On March 
12, 1940, a peace treaty between Finland and the Soviet Union was 
O d 44 signe • O. V. Kuusinen and the Democratic Republic of Finland were 
quietly dropped from the scenario and played no part in the treaty 
negotiations. In the words of W. P. Coates, a pro-Soviet author, 
"after consultation between the Soviet and 'Eerijoki (Kuusinen) Govern-
;, 45 
ments f:he later agreed to dissolve itself." 
43 Dahms, pp, 100-101, 
44 Tanner, pp. 217--248. 
45Quoted in ibid., p. 141. 
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The treaty gave the entire Karelian Isthmus, including Vyborg and 
the islands in Vyborg Bay, to Russia. In addition, the western....and 
southern shores of Lake Ladoga and sections of central and northern 
Finland were also ceded to the Soviet Union, The two nations agreed 
not to attack each other. The Hangoe peninsula was leased to Russia 
for eight million Finnish marks a year, arid the Soviet Union was given 
the right to establish a naval base there. Finland granted transit 
rights to Sweden. Some restrictions were placed on the Finnish use of 
Petsamo; these provisions were designed to keep Finland from using its 
46 Arctic coast for military purposes. The treaty was ratified in the 
Diet on March 15 by a vote of 145 to three. 
The terms of peace were harsh indeed. Finland had been forced to 
give up 35,201 square kilometers of its territory, including the ports 
of Hangoe, Vyborg, Uuras, and Koivisto. The Saima Canal was rendered 
useless, since its mouth was in Russian hands. The Karelian Isthmus 
contained most of the Finnish lumber, chemical, textile, and metal 
industries, and Finland further lost about one hundred power stations. 
About 450,000 Finns in the ceded areas chose to migrate west rather 
than to live under Soviet rule, and these refugees required aid from 
h l "f 47 t e government to start a new 1 e. Finland had been defeated and 
stripped of some of its most valuable territory. This was a fact that 
the Finns would not forget, and they would be quick to seize a chance 
for revenge. 
46 Treaty of Peace between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
and Finland, Soviet Documents£,£ Foreign Policy, Vol. III, pp. 421-423. 
47 Mazour, pp, 130-131. 
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Though defeated, the Finns were justifiably proud of their perfor-
mance. Whi~e they had not been expected to last more than a few weeks, 
they had held out for three and a half months against the most massive 
army in the world. Finnish losses had been heavy--24,923 dead and 
43,557 wounded--but Russian casualties were three times as high--48,745 
48 dead and 158,863 woundedo The Finns viewed the war as a small country 
standing alone against an overpowering colossus and took pride in the 
stand they had made. 
The Winter War hadrseveral important consequences. First of all, 
it damaged Russian prestige. As the Red army suffered defeat after 
defeat, many observers begain to dismiss it as a rather inefficient and 
impotent instrument--a conclusion which subsequent events were to belie. 
Secondly, it would contribute to a reorientation of German strategy. 
The German military men had been worried about the Red army; this 
concern was one of the reasons for the German~Soviet Non-Aggression 
pact. During the Winter War, the Germans supported the Russians and 
were rather hostile to the Finns. The war caused the Germans to have 
second thoughts about their alliance with Stalin. Finally, the Finns, 
in their mixed'pride and bitterness, seem to have reached the conclusion 
that if they could gain an ally against the Soviet Union, they could 
retake the territory that had been taken from Finland, While this atti-
tude was not openly expressed, it existed and would have a considerable 
influence on Finnish actions when Germany invaded Russia in 1941. 
48 Dahms, 
both sides. 
higher. 
p. 103. These figures are based on official records of 
Russian casualties are believed to have been considerably 
CHAPTER III 
GERMANY AND FINLAND: 1940-1944 
The treaty which ended the Winter War did not insure peace between 
Finland and Russia. The terms of the treaty had been too harsh for the 
Finns to accept willingly. The attitude of the Finns was grounded on 
the hope that after Germany was defeated, France and Great Britain 
would take action to force the Soviet Union to return what it had 
taken. There was little doubt at this time that Germany would be 
defeated, and the statements of British and French leaders with regard 
to Finland encouraged Finnish hopes. Prime Minister Chamberlain's 
speech to Parliament on March 19, 1940, praised the valor of the Finns 
and expressed hope for a more just peace after the war. 1 
On March 18, 1940, Finland, Sweden, and Norway began negotiations 
on a mutual defense alliance. The idea was not new~ for the first 
attempt at such an action had been in the mid-1930's. Basically, the 
proposed treaty would have meant that an invasion of any of the three 
nations would be met by united military action by all three. The inten-
tion seems to have been to prevent a recurrence of the Winter War.- Such 
an alliance might have been sufficient to defeat the Russian invasion 
of Finland in 1939. This thought was probably uppermost in the minds of 
the delegates at the negotiations. Therefore, a mutual assistance 
1The Times (London, March 20, 1940},. p. 4. 
50 
treaty could possibly prevent a new invasion of any of these 
Scandinavian countries by Russia, Germany, or any other potential 
. d 2 inva er. On March 29, Molotov declared that the proposal alliance 
was directed against the Soviet Union and, therefore, was a violation 
of the Finno-Soviet treaty of 1940. To the Finns, this action demon-
strated that the Russians were trying to restrict Finland's freedom of 
action. Even Finns like Mannerheim and Paasikivi who understood the 
necessity of good relations with Russia deplored the Soviet move, 
stating that it would further promote Finnish distru~t of the Soviet 
Union. Nevertheless, Soviet opposition to this defense plan caused it 
3 to be dropped. 
In the treaty of 1940, Finland had leased Hangoe to the Soviet 
Union as a naval base. The Russians subsequently forced Finland to 
allow the base to be supplied over Finnish railroads ratber than by sea. 
A transit treaty was signed on September 6, 1940, authorizing Russian 
supply trains to use Finnish railroads. The Soviet Union also demanded 
the return of private property taken from the Karelian Isthmus and 
Hangoe prior to the Soviet occupation; in some cases, property removed 
before the war had to be returned. Of particular interest to the 
Russians were factory machinery and railroad rolling stock, These exac-
tions were not part of the peace treaty but were added by Russia after 
its ratification. 4 
2The Times (London, March 21, 1940), p. 7. 
3Anthony F. Upton, Finland in Crisis: 1940-1941 (Ithaca, N.Y.~ 
Cornell Univetsity Press, 1964), pp. 51-53. 
4wuorinen, Finland and World War 1.1= 1939-1944, pp. 83-84. 
51 
Another action taken by the Soviet Union which appeared to reduce 
Finnish independence was the proposal for a joint Finno-Russian company 
to operate the nickel mines in the Petsamo area. 5 After the German con-
quest of Norway in April, 1940, Petsamo provided Finland's only access 
to the Arctic. The Soviet demand seen1ed to be an attempt to further 
control Finnish use of the area. Negotiations between the two nations 
continued, but the matter had not been settled when war was resumed. 6 
In the summer of 1940, the Soviet Union annexed Latvia, Lithuania, 
and Estonia, charging that the three nations were conspiring against 
Russia. This action worried the Finns, especially since the original 
treaties had provided only for the establishment of bases in the Baltic 
countries similar to that at Hangoe. The Russians seemed to be inter-
fering with Finnish domestic affairs in the same way that they had 
tampered with the Baltic nations before their annexation by the Soviet 
Union. When Molotov stated that the retention of Vaeinoe Tanner as 
Foreign Minister would hinder good relations between Finland and Russia, 
Tanner resigned. President Kyoesti Kallio resigned the presidency in 
November, 1940, and the Finns held an election for a new president. The 
Soviet Union announced that Tanner, Mannerheim, Svinhufvud and T. M. 
Kivimaeki, who had been active in suppressing the Communists in the 
1920's and 30's, would be unacceptable to the Soviet Union. 7 While 
5The mines had been operated by an Anglo-Canadian firm, 
6wuorinen, Finland and World War II: 1939-1944, pp. 83-84. 
7 Statement by Molotov to the Finnish Ambassador in Moscow on the 
proposal for a Swedish-Finnish agreement and on the Forthcoming Presi-
dential elections, December 6, 1940, Soviet Documents .QQ_ Foreign Policy, 
Vol. III, p. 479. 
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none of these men had been considered, this type of interference 
strengthened the Finnish belief that the Soviet Union intended to reduce 
Finland to the position of a vassal state, 
From a military standpoint, Finland had been placed in a difficult 
position. Her new borders were not only longer than the prewar bounda-
ries but were also more difficult to defend. In the Karelian Isthmus, 
besides the regular border forces, the Soviet Union had an entire army 
corps which could be employed at any point along the southeast border 
of Finland; in addition, there was a force of five thousand Russians in 
Hangoe, equipped with tanks, armored cars, railroad artillery, and 
other weapons which were more appropriate to ground attack than coast 
defense. 8 
Encouraged by increasing Soviet influence in Finland, the Finnish 
Communists began to emerge from hiding, While Communism had been out~ 
lawed in Finland since 1918, defeat in the Winter War caused the govern-
ment to be cautious about suppressing Communist activities because of 
the danger of offending Russia. On May 22, 1940, the Suomen-
I 
Neuvostolutetan Rauhan Ji!. Ystaevyyden Seura (Finnish-Soviet Peace and 
Friendship Society) was founded. The SNS, directed by Communists and 
leftwing Socialists, was ostensibly intended to improve relations 
between Finland and Russia and promote a campagin to eliminate hostile 
feelings toward the Soviet Union. In reality, it was a front for the 
revival of the Connnunist Party in Finland. The Finnish government 
regarded the organization as a potential fifth column, endeavored, upon 
Tanner's recommendation, to keep its articles out of general circulation, 
aw . uorinen, Finland~ World 1Jar II: 
I 
1939-1944, pp, 85-86. 
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and applied other harassments intended to discourage the SNS membership 
and keep it under control. 9 However, the Soviet Union officially 
condoned the activities of the SNS and gave it moral and financial 
b k " 10 ac 1ng. Because of this Soviet action, the Finnish government did 
not take the final step of ordering the movement dissolved. Whether 
the SNS was under the domination of Moscow, as Tanner and other leading 
Finns believed, is uncertain, In any case, the Russian recognition of 
the organization was another example of interference in Finnish affairs 
which many Finns regarded with suspicion. 
On the other hand, the Finns were allowed to rebuild their border 
defenses without active Soviet opposition. The 1940 treaty had not 
restricted Finnish military activities except along the Arctic coast, 
where sea traffic to Murmansk could be affected. Under the direction 
of Field Marshal Mannerheim, the Finns began to build a larger and 
better equipped army. A larger army was required because the new 
' 
borders of Finland were not as easy to defend as the old. The Finnish 
army had been deficient in antitank guns and ammunition for all types 
of artillery; Mannerheim resolved that this situation would not recur 
and was given full authority by the Diet to proceed with his plans, 
New fortifications were constructed, partly with Swedish aid, While 
these defenses were never used, they provided employment for many 
9 Upton, pp. 98-lOQ, 
10speech by Molotov to the Seventh Session of the Supreme Soviet on 
the incorporation of Bessarabia and the Baltic States, and Soviet 
roreign r.elations, August 1, 1940, Soviet Documents£!!. Foreign Policy, 
Vol. III, pp. 461-469. 
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refugees from the Karelian Isthmus and thus eased the unemployment 
. . 11 
situation to some extent. 
While the work on the fortifications, was proceeding, Mannerheim 
sought for a practical way of organizing a larger army. The army of 
1939 had consisted of nine infantry division; the new army was to con-
sist of sixteen infantry divisions, two elite Jaeger brigades, and a 
motorized cavalry brigade. Equipping the new army was the major probQem. 
Remembering that they had not heeded Mannerheim's warnings that the 
Finnish military budget was too small prior to the Winter War, the 
government agreed to find the money for new equipment, and Finnish in-
dustry began to manufacture anti-aircraft artillery, anti-tank guns, a 
new 120nnn mortar, and 105nnn howitzers. Production of the nine milli-
meter Suomi machine pistol, which was very useful in forest fighting, 
was also stepped up. Finally, the ammunition supply of the Finnish army 
was vastly improved; the situation in the Winter War where Finnish 
artillery had been silenced by lack of she11s more often than Russian 
activity would not be repeated. In addition, two hJndred 75mm guns and 
thirty-two other pieces of heavy field artillery arrived from the 
United States via Petsamo. 12 
Despite the improvements in Finnish equipment, the arms embargo 
applied to Finland by Germany held back many shipments of weapons and 
hampered Finnish military reconstruction to a great extent. The effect 
of this embargo was particularly severe after the fall of France in 
June, 1940. Hitler's conquest of western Europe caused the Finns to 
11 Upton, pp, 78-81, 
12Ibi'd,, 84 85 pp. - • 
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consider attempting to reach an agreement with Germany; at the same 
time, the apparent elimination of any threat from the West seems to have 
caused Hitler to reconsider his treaty with the Soviet Union. Russia 
was continuing to improve its military forces and had gained several 
key bases which could be used for offensive as well as defensive 
13 purposes. Therefore, Hitler decided to move against Russia in hopes 
of removing any possible threat there to Germany; because of his deci-
sion, Germany's relationship to Finland was also to change. 
During the Winter War, though officially neutral, Germany had pur-
sued a rather hostile policy toward Finland. Ribbentrop ordered embassy 
officials in Finland, Russia, and other nations to stress the justice of 
the Russian claims and blame Finland for the war. 14 The German news 
service was also instructed to play up Finnish guilt and blame England 
for the refusal of Finland to grant the territorial changes desired by 
the Soviet Union. In January, 1940, Tanner had asked the German 
Minister to Finland if Germany would attempt to mediate a settlement to 
the waro The answer was a polite negative coupled with an implication 
that if Finland accepted aid from France and Great Britain, Germany 
· h h h 'd f h s O u · 15 m1g tenter t e war on t e s1 e o t e ov1et n1on. 
Germany had also contributed in a more material way to defeat of 
Finland. War materials from Italy were denied passage through Germany. 
In one case, fifty Italian fighter planes being shipped to Finland 
13 Speech by·Molotov to the Supreme Soviet on the war with Finland 
and Soviet Foreign Policy, Soviet Documents .Q.!l Foreign Policy, Vol. III, 
pp. 436-449. 
14Ribbentrop, Foreign Ministry Circular, December 12, 1939,.~-
ments .Q.!l German Foreign Policy, Ser. D, Vol, III, p. 501. 
15Bluecher to Weizsaecker, January 4, 1940, ibib., p. 613. 
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through Germany were held up.16 When the Russian Navy decided on a 
submarine blockade of the Gulf of Bothnia, they requested German supply 
ships to provision and fuel their vessels at sea. 17 The Germans agreed, 
hoping for similar aid in the Far East. After the Winter War ended, 
Germany continued to block any arms shipments to Finland through Germany 
or German-occupied territory. 
By July, 1940, the German attitude began to change. Germany had 
occupied northern France and had driven the British off the Continent. 
Italy and most of the Balkan nations were allied with Hitler; Germany 
seemed to have won the war. The need to keep the Soviet Union neutral 
was no longer as pressing as had been the case the previous March. A 
second reason for the change in German thinking was the need to supply 
its troops in Norway. The British navy made sea transport through the 
Atlantic difficult; a shorter andr safer route lay across the Baltic sea 
and then overland through Sweden and Finland~ In September, 1940, 
Germany sent an anti-aircraft battalion to Norway via Finland; at the 
same time, the Soviet Union was advised of the action and the reason 
for it--protection from British bombers.18 Russia made no protest about. 
the incident. 
On September 22, 1940, Germany and Finland reached an agreement on 
the transit of German troops through Finland to Norway. The terms were 
16wiehl to Embassy in Italy, December 12, 1939, ibid., p. 507. 
17 Scherpenberg to Weizsaecker, December 12, 1939, ibid., p, 507. 
18Ribbentrop to Embassy in Soviet Union, September 16, 1940, Docu-
ments.££_ German Foreign Policy, Ser. D, Vol. XI, pp. 92-93. 
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similar to the treaty allowing Russia to supply its troops in Hangoe by 
rail and the Swedish-German agreement of July 5, 1940. The agreement 
provided that: (1) Germany could ship troops and equipment to Finnish 
ports on the Gulf of Bothnia (mainly Vaasa, Oulu, and Kemi) and then 
along the Arctic Highway by way of the Rovaniemi to the Norwegian town 
of Kirkennes; (2) Germany would inform Finland of the time of departure 
of troop transports from Germany and their time -of arrival in Finland 
at least one day in advance; and (3) troops and equipment would be 
19 
shipped in separate railroad cars. When the Soviet Union was informed 
of the agreement it showed signs of surprise and possibly alarm at the 
idea of having German troops in Finland. Molotov asked if Finland had 
been forced to grant the concession under threat of German invasion. 
The negative Finnish reply, combined with German assurances that the 
troops were being sent to Norw.ay, may have quieted any Soviet fears; at 
20 
any rate there was no further Russian protest. 
Another reason for the change in German attitudes was that the 
occupation of Norway had changed the German military situation. Since 
the easiest way to supply troops in northern Norway was through the Gulf 
of Bothnia and then through Finland, Germany began to show an interest 
in events which could threaten this supply line. The negotiations 
between Finland and the Soviet Union on the Aaland Islands were there-
fore of interest to Germany, While Germany never took any direct part 
in these n~gotiations, it instructed its legation1 in Helsinki to keep 
19w' k Bl h S b 22 1940 'b 0 d 148 149 eizsaec er to uec er, eptem er , , 1 1 • , pp. - , 
20 Bluecher to Weizsaecker, September 22, 1940, ibid,, p. 160. 
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informed on their progress and to advise the Finns of the German interest 
. h . 1 d 21 int e is ans. For similar reasons, Germany was concerned about. 
possible Soviet occupation of the Petsamo region. Petsamo in Russian 
hands would have meant that German use.of the Arctic Highway to supply 
Norway would have been subject to Soviet regulation. 22 
Germany had interests in Petsamo besides a safe supply route to 
Norway. Nickel had been discovered in the area in 1924; the Finnish 
government had signed a contract with a subsidiary company of the Inter-
national Nickel Company of Canada to mine the deposits. The company was 
to begin mining operations ny 1941. Germany had concLuded an agreement 
with the Finnish government in April, 1940, to receive sixty percent of 
the metal mined. 23 But two months later Molotov proposed that the 
nickel mining concession be transferred to the Soviet Union or that a 
Russian-Finnish company be formed to extract the ore in place of the 
Anglo-Canadian trust. The net result of this demand would have been 
Soviet control of Petsamo, probably in order to provide greater security 
from a possible threat to Murmansk from German troops in Norway. Also, 
control of the nickel mines would give the Soviet Union greater bargain-
24 ing power in the event of a dispute with Germany. In the negotiations 
which followed in the next twelve months, Germany reversed its previous 
policy, advising the Finns to resist the Soviet proposal but not to 
21Ribbentrop to Legation in Finland, September 23, 1940, ibid., p. 
191. 
22 Bluecher to Weizsaecker, January 26, 1941, ibid., pp. 1199-1200. 
23Nickel was vital to the German armanent industries. 
24 H. Peter Krosby, Finland~ Germany, and~ poviet Union: 1940-
1941 (Marrison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 1968), pp. 4-5, 27-34. 
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. R . f ·1· . 25 give ussia an excuse or mi itary action. The Finns, feeling them-
selves bound by the contract with the International Nickel Company, did 
not give in to the Soviet request. The Soviet Union used different 
sorts of pressure. At one time Soviet exporits of various foodstuffs to 
Finland were cut off in an attempt to force the Finns to agree to the 
Russian demands. At .the same time, the Soviet Minister to Finland was 
recalled, The Finns, receiving reports of Soviet troop concentration 
on the Karelian Isthmus, interpreted this move to mean that war was 
26 imm~nent and mobilized part of their army. The Soviet Union 
apparently was merely bluffing or did not wish to risk a repetition of 
the Winter War, for the crisis temporarily eased soon after the Finnish 
mobilization. Germany stated that the agreement of April 23, 1940, 
guaranteed it sixty percent of the ore mined and that its armament 
industries needed the material. The Soviet Union replied that if Finland 
would agree to a Finnish-Russian company to work th~ mines, Germany 
would receive sixty percent of the mines' output until December 1, when 
the German contract expired. 27 The negotiations continued until the 
outbreak of war bet~een Germany and Russia, and the issue was not 
definitely settled until the Soviet Union took possession of Petsamo at 
the close of World War II. 
Having changed its thinking toward Finland, Germany prepared to 
offer more than mere moral support. On October 1, 1940, Lieutenant 
25Wiehl to Embassy in Soviet Union, November 27, 1940, Documents on 
German Foreign Policy, Ser. D, Vol. XI, pp. 722-723. 
2& Bluecher to Weizsaecker, January 10, 1941, ibid., p, 1139. 
27schulenberg to Weizsaecker, February 11, 1941, Documents on 
German Foreign Policy, Ser. D, Vol. XII, pp, 196-197. 
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Colonel Joseph Veltjens, of the J. Veltjens Arms and Munitions firm of 
Germany, concluded a contract with the Finnish government to supply 
equipment that the Finnish army needed. Finland was to pay for the new 
arms in a number of ways. Money and certain goods such as nickel and 
lumber products were the basic forms of payment, while the right of 
transit to Norway for German troops constituted part of the bargain 
also. Equipment being shipped to Finland but seized by Germany in 
Norway was to be released immediately; if German troops had used such 
. 1 h G f 1 . 28 V 1 ' 1 materia, t e erman irm was to rep ace it. e tJens was a so 
responsible for the German-Finnish transit agreement. Finland's most 
important purchases from Germany were of artillery, which the Finnish 
army was very short of. The Finnish Minister of Defense, Rudolf Walden, 
ultimately bought twenty-three light and forty heavy batteries of field 
artillery, twenty-eight anti-aircraft batteries, and 150,000 land: 
29 
mines. The Finns also bought modern aircraft, mostly fighter planes, 
and communication and transporation equipment. These purchases from 
Germany, combined with the Finnish domestic arms production, were to 
make the Finnish army a formidable force when war with Russia was 
resumed in June, 1941. 30 
Why did the Finns turn to Germany? Hitler was often attacked by 
the Finnish press, and the Finnish people were not fond of the Nazi 
regime in Germany, although there were close times between German and 
Finnish citizens dating from the civil war. Germany had been rather 
28Bluecher to Weizsaecker, October 1, 1940, ibid., Vol. XI, pp. 232-
233. 
29An artillery battery usually consists of four to eight guns. 
30 Upton, p. 85. 
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hostile to Finland in the Winter War, refusing even to attempt to 
mediate a settlement between the Finns and the Russians. On the other 
hand, the army had to be re-equipped, and after the German conquest of 
Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium, and France, Germany was the only 
nation capable of giving Finland the aid it needed, Accepting German 
arms did not mean that Finland was simultaneously adopting German 
ideology. Finnish foreign policy had never followed a set pattern but 
constantly adapted itself to circumstances. The Finns could not defeat 
Russia alone; Finland was faced, therefore, with a situation in which 
Russia had to be.either satisfied or balanced against another power. 
At the same time, the interests of Great Britain and the North American 
countries had to be considered, since they were the source of much of 
31 Finland's food supply. Still, Germany was the only nation that was 
capable of acting as a check on Russian demands. Therefore, Finland 
found it expedient to turn to Gennany for aid. 
By August, 1940, Hitler had apparently decided to attack Russia 
before the Soviet armed forces became too strong to defeat. The value 
of having Finland as an ally for operations in the northern areas of 
Russia seems to have occurred to the German High Command before the end 
of 1940. In February, 1941, Lieutenant General Hans von Seidel and 
Colonel Erich Buschenhagen visited Finland ostensibly on an inspection 
tour of the Luftwaffe supply organization in Finland. However, in a 
visit to Mannerheim's headquarters, the subject of Finnish participation 
in the event of a German-Russian war was brought.up, At this point, 
31Bluecher to Weizsaecker, April 2, 1941, Documents on German 
Foreign Policy, Ser. D, Vol. XII, pp. 433-435, 
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only Finnish war aims were discussed; no attempt was made to co-
ordinate strategy or tacti.cs. The German officers were not allowe·d to 
speak of the actual plans for a .German invasion of Russia. The Finns 
stated that they wished to regain .the 1939 .boundaries at the very 
least; the .maximum advance·.would be to a .line extending from the 
Baltic Sea along the 1939 boundary of the Karelian Isthmus to Lake 
Ladoga, then northeast.to Lake Onega and further north to the White 
32 Sea. The Germans remained evasive and non-commital about.the pro-
bability of war actually taking place, but the stage was set for 
further talks. 
The Finnish government apparently did not hear of the conversation 
between Mannerheim and Seidel, or they did not consider it worthwhile 
to act that that point. The Diet had given Mannerheim complete authority 
as far as military matters were concerned. The government of Finland 
put complete trust in his juggment and decisions. He took whatever 
action that would be best for Finland. Mannerheim seems to have been 
apolitical; the relative merits of Communism, Nazism, or democracy 
seem to have been irrelevant to him. His only concern was his love for 
Finland and its welfare. He supported the Finnish government but 
remained politically aloof unless his opinion was asked for. Possibly 
Mannerheim would have preferred British or American aid if it had been 
available in sufficient quantities to fit Finnish needs. However, 
Britain was forced to divert most of her energy to rearming its forces 
after Dunkirk, and the United States was busy arming its recently 
expanded army. German aid was the only alternative. 
32Roessing to Matzyky, February 21, 1941, ibid., pp. 122-126. 
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On May 25, 1941, a conference between German and.Finnish military 
representafives took place in Salzburg. The Finns were told of a 
possible impending German attack on Russia. Con_cerning Finland, the 
Frontier was divided into German and Finnish sectors. The Germans 
would operate in northern and central Finland; the Finns would be con-
cerned with the area near Lake Lad~ga. The plan of operations was for 
the German troops to move toward Murmansk and, occupy the Kola Peninsula; 
two Finnish divisions were to cover the German flank, In southeast 
Finland, the Finns would mobilize their army to freeze Soviet troops in 
the vicinity of Leningrad but would not be required to attack. The 
Soviet base in Hangoe was to be sealed off; again no assault would be 
required until German air support was available. The Finns would also 
provide anti-aircraft protection for unloading operations on the Gulf 
of Bothnia and for German troops in the vicinity of Rovaniemi and 
K . , . 33 em1Jaerv1. 
The head of the Finnish delegation, Lieutenant General Erik 
Heinrichs of the Finnish General Staff raised a few minor objections 
to the plan from the Finnish standpoint and cormnented that Finnish 
troops near Lake Ladoga would attack if Finland accepted the plan. 
However, the Finns did not definitely promise anything, The Germans 
maintained that an attack would not be launched unless a series of 
important negotiations.proved fruitless. In reality, there were no such 
negotiations in progress. 
Subsequent talks between General Heinrichs and General Franz Halder, 
Chief of Staff of the German Army, during the next three days at Berlin 
33 Memorandum of the German High Command, May 25, 1941,"ibid., pp, 
879-885. 
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were designed to further clarify the military situation in Finland. 
Halder was interested particularly in the possibility of Finnish troops 
launching an offensive to support the German drive on Leningrad. 
Heinrichs again was non-committal but seems to have hinted that such 
action might be possible. Again, war between Germany and Russia was 
t d . 'b"l" h h . 34 Th . f " reate as a possi i ity rat er tan a certainty. e in ormation 
gained from the Salzburg conference was subsequently transmitted to 
Mannerheim and Ryti. Ryti ultimately made the decision which meant a 
new war with Russia. 
At this point, Ryti performed a few acts which were a departure 
from the usual Finnish procedure. The Diet was not informed of what 
had been discussed at Salzburg. There is no definite information on 
why Ryti and his cabinet acted as they did. However, there are several 
possibilities. Ryti shared the bitterness of all Finns in their defeat 
by Russia in the Winter War; this feeling may have been more intense, 
since he was Prime Minister of Finland when the treaty of 1940 was 
signed. Tanner was Minister of Finance; his feelings were definitely 
anti-Russian. Other members of the cabinet were similarly overly in-
fluenced by their bitterness toward Russia. Instead of a man like the 
astute and experienced Paasikivi, a former professor of foreign rela-
tions at the University of Helsinki, Rolf Witting, was Foreign Minister. 
The Finns, comparing the German exploits in Poland and western Europe 
with the Russian experiences in the Winter War, seem to have reached the 
conclusion that the Soviet Union would be no match for Germany and that 
the war would be over within a few months. Hence, Finland with German 
34 t.rpton, pp. 250-260. 
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aid could regain the territory which the Finns regarded as rightfully 
theirs. Finally, the decision to go to war does not seem to have been 
weighed with sufficient care. No consideration seems to have been 
given to what a long war would mean to Finland or how nations such as 
Great Britain and the United States would view German-Finnish co-
operation. 
President Ryti began to prepare the government for war on May 30 
when he warned that German transits through Finland might increase in 
volume because of the tension between Germany and the Soviet Union. He 
further stated that either side might try to use Finnish territory to 
their advantage; Petsamo, the Aaland Islands, and Hangoe were especially 
threatened. Mannerheim was preparing to guard against any dangers in 
35 these areas. Conferences were held in Helsinki between the second and 
sixth of June to conclude preparations for Finnish-German co-operation 
against Russiao The final plan was the one proposed by the Germans at 
Salzburg, with the exception that the Finnish divisions in southeast 
Finland would attack as soon as possible. Mobilization would commence 
on June 10 and would be completed by the twentieth. 36 The Finnish 
government insisted on one thing: that Finland not appear as an 
aggressor. Ryti, Foreign Minister Witting, and Mannerheim all wanted 
it to appear that Finland had been attacked by Russia, Therefore, the 
opening attacks were not to be launched from Finnish territory. Once 
the war began farther south, however, the concentration of German troops 
and aircraft in Finland, the blockade of Hangoe, and the mobilization 
35Ibid., pp. 261-262. 
36 Buschenhagen to Jodl, June 4, 1941, Documents on.German Foreigp 
Policy, Ser. D, Vol. XII, p, 963. 
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of the Finnish army would probably be enough to provoke Russian ground 
or air attacks. This action would suffice to bring Finland into the 
37 
war. 
Despite the close co-operation envisioned b~tween the German and 
Finnish armies, the Finns insisted that Finland was going to war as an 
independent nation rather than as a German satellite or puppet state. 
Some pro-German elements had arranged in 1940 for a battalion of Finns 
to be sent to Germany for training in the same way that the Lockstedt 
Jaegars had been trained in World War I. Mannerheim opposed the move, 
however, fearing that Germany might decide that Finland could be con-
verted into a Nazi state from the willingness by the Finns to take 
such action. In the Helsinki conference of June, 1941, he specifically 
warned that any German attempt to set up a puppet government in Finland 
similar to that in Norway would destroy all chances of Finnish-German 
co-operation. 38 Mannerheim also reserved almost complete freedom in 
determining how the.Finnish and German troops under his command in 
southeast Finland would be used. 39 The Finnish government, unaware that 
the reported negotiations between Germany and Russia were not taking 
place, also took steps to make sure it could explain away its mobiliza-
tion if war did not take placeo Foreign Minister Witting stated that 
millions of German and Russian troops were facing each other "from the 
Black Sea to the White Sea'.'; because of the danger that Russia might 
37 Upton, pp. 266-267. 
38Ibid., p. 267. 
39Two German infantry divisions were sent to Mannerheim to replace 
the two Finnish divisions serving with the German army in northern 
Finland. 
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attack the German troops in Finland, the Finnish army was being mobi-
lized. The action was represented as a precautionary measure to keep 
the country out of the war, but if Russia attacked Finland, German aid 
40 
could be expected. 
The Finnish reasons for going to war in 1941 seem to have been a 
desire to regain what had been taken from them and a hope to eliminate 
the Soviet Union as a threat to Finnish independence. Finland believed 
that Germany would defeat Russia; as a co-belligerant of Germany, the 
Finns would be able to reclaim what had been taken from them in 1940. 
After this goal had been accomplished, Finland would disassociate itself 
from Germany. This policy was basically the goal of Finnish diplomacy 
throughout the war; to regain what Finland had lost and then withdraw 
from the war. 
Again the Finnish cabinet does not seem to have carefully con-
sidered what its position would entail. First of all, trying to con-
vince the rest of the world that Finland was not under German influence 
would be very difficult. Secondly, if Russia held out against Germany, 
the task of reaching an agreement with the Soviets would have to be. 
faced. Thirdly, Finland could be in serious difficulty if Germany did 
not want Finland to withdraw from the waro None of these difficulties 
seem to have been considered by Ryti or his cabinet. 
The German invasion of Russia began on June 22, 1941. The German 
troops in Finland temporarily remained in position despite Hitler's 
proclamation that Finnish forces were attacking the Soviet Union in 
league with German forces. However, the Russians reacted as Mannerheim 
40Bluecher to Weizsaecker, June 13, 1941, Documents on German 
Foreign Policy, Ser. D, Vol XII, p. 1023. · 
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and Ryti had predicted. On the day the invasion began, Soviet bombers 
attacked Finnish positions on the island of Alskaer and bombed two 
Finnish warships in the Gulf of Finland. Since the Finnish troops were 
not yet in the positions from which Mannerheim wished to begin his 
offensive, Witting protested the incident to the Russian Minister to 
Finland. 41 The Russian Minister denied that any attacks had taken 
place, but on June 25, 1941, the Finnish Diet declared war on the Soviet 
Union. The Finnish government, army, and population all seemed to have 
hoped and believed that Finlartd could at last be rid of its hereditary 
enemy--Russia. 
The Finns were worried about.one thing in particular, however. 
Much of Finland's food supply came from Great Britain and North America; 
if Britain joined the Soviet Union, Finnish grain supplies could be cut 
off. Great Britain hinted that this action might be taken but expressed 
its desire to maintain diplomatic relations with Finland; Finland was 
equally eager to maintain its relations with England. However, British 
newspapers began to adopt a critical and often hostile attitude toward 
Finnish participation in the war against Russia, and inevitably rela-
tions between Finland and Great Britain began to deteriorate. 42 
In July, 1941, Finland began to consider seriously breaking off its 
relations with Great Britain and recalling its diplomatic staff. The 
main reason for the Finnish action was the view that the British 
alliance with Russia combined with the blockade of Petsamo, which had 
been instituted by the Royal Navy in June, made normal relations 
41Bluecher to Weizsaecher, June 22, 1941, ibid., p. 1079. 
42Gripenberg, pp. 185-190. 
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impossible. Therefore, nothing was to be gained by keeping the lega-
tions in both.countries open. At the same time, the Finnish government 
declared that it had no interest in western Europe and would not be 
d . h . h 43 rawn into t e war int at area. On July 27, Witting gave the 
British Minister of Helsinki a document stating that because of the 
British alliance with Russia and its promise to aid the Soviet Union in 
every possible way, normal diplomatic relations could not be con-
tinued.44 While this view may have been correct, the delay of the 
British government: in recalling its staff made it appear that·Finland 
had taken the action unilaterally and, by inference, as a result of 
German pressure. The British press played up this idea, ignoring the 
\ 
reasons given in the Finnish document. While Germany had been pressuring 
Finland to break off diplomatic relations with Great Britain since the 
German invasion of Russia, there is no evidence that this pressure was 
the reason for the rupture between Finland and England. The British 
government avoided formally ending diplomatic relations until August 1, 
although British planes attacking Kirkenes, Norway, bombed the Finnish 
45 
village of Luenahamari possibly the accident, on July 30. Great 
Britain did not declare war on Finland, however, until December 6, 1941. 
Fortunately, this British action resulted in no casualties to either 
nation. 
43 Bluecher to Woerman, July 22, 1941, Documents on German Foreign 
Policy, Ser. D, Vol. XII, p. 202. 
44Gripenberg, pp. 196-198. 
45Ibid., pp. 199-203. 
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The Finns maintained from the start of the war· that their 
struggle was to guarantee their independence rather than to gain more 
territory. While Finland was co-operating with Germany in military 
operations, the Finnish campaign was not connected to Germany in a 
political sense. In other words, Finland was waging its war as an inde-
pendent nation rather than as a German puppet state. At the same time, 
elements existed which could make Finland more dependent on Germany. 
Sixteen percent of the Finnish population were under arms; the economy 
would break down if large segments of the army were not soon released. 
The Finnish population could only be fed if additional food supplies 
were brought in from abroad, and the only source of these food supplies 
46 
was Germany. 
Mannerheim envisioned the Finnish operations in three parts: first 
of all, an advance to the 1939 borders of western Karelia; secondly, 
reoccupation of the Karelian Isthmus; and thirdly, an offensive into 
eastern Karelia to achieve greater security for Finland. The first and 
second stages ran concurrently, since the Finns moved to their 1939 
borders by August 31 and reoccupied the Karelian Isthmus by early 
47 September. Some fighting continued on the Isthmus until the end of 
September as the Finns drove out the Soviet rearguard. The Germans 
began to pressure Mannerheim into joining in an attack on Leningrad when 
the city was cut off from the rest of Russia, Though the government of 
Finland forbade Mannerheim to advance further south on the Karelian 
46 Bluecher to Woerman, September 1, 1941, Documents on German 
Foreign Policy, Ser. D, Vol. XIII, pp., 417-418. 
47The Times (London, September 5, 1941), p. 8. 
Isthmus than the 1939 border, Ryti promised the Germans at the same 
time that Finland would not demobilize its forces. 48 
Mannerheim's advance into eastern Karelia, though resisted 
stubbornly by the Red army, was successful. By December 5, 1941, 
Finnish troops had reached the Svir River, which connects Lake Onega 
71 
with Lake Ladoga. At that point, Mannerheim decided that further advance 
would not be practical and ordered the drive halted. 49 Although Finland 
had lost more men than in the Winter War, the Finns felt they had 
gained greater security than at any time since their independence. For 
the next thirty months, the Finnish-Russian front was quiet. The Soviet 
Union could not spare the troops to attack the Finns, and the Finns had 
no wish to drive deeper into Soviet territory. The war between Finland 
and Russia, therefore, reached a stalemate which lasted until June, 1944. 
At the same time, Mannerheim began to make plans to reduce the army to 
about 150,000 men so that the Finnish economy could be returned to 
normal. 
Britain's attitude toward the Finns was either naive or very 
cynical, especially considering that England had been at the verge of 
war with Russia over Finland about eighteen months previously. On 
September 22, 1941, Foreign Minister Anthony Eden sent a message to 
Witting warning Finland not to advance into eastern Karelia but to with-
draw to the 1939 boundaries. Furthermore, it was pointed out that rela-
tions between Britain and Finland could not be very good as long as 
48 Bluecher to Woerman, September 1, 1941, Documents on German Foreign 
Policy, Ser. D, Vol. XIII, pp. 421-422. 
49Jutikkala, p. 282. 
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German troops stood on Finnish soil. The essence of Eden's message was 
that if Finland would stop its part of the war, withdraw to its 1939 
frontiers, and somehow expel the Germans, Great Britain.and Finland 
would be good friends again. 50 The possibility that Russia might 
decide to continue the war was not considered, and the Finnish view 
that the extra territory in eastern Karelia was necessary for Finnish 
security was not mentioned. Finally Eden did not seem to have given 
consideration to what might happen if the Germans refused to leave 
Finland. On October 8, Witting sent a negative reply to the English 
proposal. Great Britain repeated its terms on November 28, but again 
offered no guarantee that the Soviet Union would be satisfied with the 
1939 boundaries of Finland. Eden, however, went further than in his 
note of September 22; if Finnish troops were not withdrawn to the 1939 
border, Great Britain would declare war on Finland. On December 4, 1941, 
F . 1 d . d h 1 · 51 in an reJecte t e u t1matum. On December 6, 1941, Great Britain 
declared war on Finland even as the Finnish Diet announced the reincor-
poration of the territories lost in 1940. 
Could Finland have accepted the British offers? At the end of 
1941, the answer seems to have been no. First of all, the question of 
whether Russia would accept the 1939 borders was very disturbing to the 
Finnish government, especially since Britain gave no guarantee that 
those borders would be respected. Secondly, there was the matter of what 
Germany would do, There were German troops in Finland. Because of bad 
harvests in Finland, the Finnish population was faced with a serious 
50 Bluecher to Woerman, September 24, 1941, Documents on German 
Foreign Policy, Ser. D, Vol. XIII, pp. 558-560. 
51 Bluecher to Woerman, December 4, 1941, ibid., p. 949. 
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food shortage, and Germany had promised to send food to help the 
F . 52 inns. Any English grain supplies would have had to enter through 
Petsamo, and even if there had been no German troops in Petsamo, the 
nearness of a German air base at Kirkenes would have made it difficult 
to land sufficient supplies to ease the situation. It also seems 
doubtful that Russia could have helped Finland very much at this point 
in the war even if it had been willing to. 
Part of the difficulty facing Finland was the nature of the war. 
Finland viewed its war with Russia as a local affair, waged separately 
from the German campaign. Although Finnish troops co-operated with 
German forces, the Finns held that the Finnish war was conducted to 
guarantee Finland's independence and security rather than for terri-
torial expansion. When Finnish forces reached the positions that would 
mean maximum security for Finland., the advance was halted. Because of 
this view, the Finnish government refused to participate in drives 
against Leningrad or Murmansk. 
Unfortunately, no nation was willing to accept the Finnish view-
point except Germany. England and.the United States condemned Finland 
for waging an aggressive war in accord with Germany. The presence of 
German troops and aircraft in Finland, combined with the Finnish de-
pendence on Germany for food and munitions, were interpreted as proof 
53 that Finland was a full-fledged ally of Germany. The Allied view was 
not correct, although Germany was pressuring the Finnish to agree to an 
alliance which would hold Finland in war as long as Ge.rmany was fighting. 
52 Bluecher to Woerman, November 23, 1941, ibid., p. 814. 
53The Times (London, September 24, 1941), p. 4. 
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In January, 1942, Mannerheim began to question German capabilities 
to defeat Russia and recommended that Finland somehow withdraw from the 
war. From January, 1942, to September, 1944, Finland was in a very 
awkward position. At the same time that it was seeking a way to dis-
engage itself from the war, it had to stay in the good graces of 
Germany in the event that German aid would be needed. On June 4, 1942, 
Hitler visited Mannerheim in Helsinki to convey best wishes on the 
Field Marshal's seventy-fifth birthday and to obtain Finnish assistance 
in the north. The following month, Mannerheim and his chief of staff 
.. d G " ff "d 54 v1s1te ermany 1n an e art to secure more a1 • The net result of 
these visits and the German aid to Finland was that Finland, although 
not formally allied with Germany, could not easily disassociate itself 
from German influence. When the Finnish Minister to Germany asked on 
November 30, 1942, if Germany would object if Finland began negotiations 
with the Soviet Union, the reply was that such action would be inter-
preted as a sign of weakness and should be avoided. However, the Finnish 
M. . f S d d d k . 'th R ' SS 1n1ster o we en was or ere to eep 1n contact w1 uss1a. 
On February 2, 1943, the German Sixth Army surrendered at 
Stalingrad; the following day, President Ryti visited Mannerheim to 
obtain his views on th~ outcome of the war. The discussion established 
that Germany's military position was beginning to deteriorate and that 
Finland should get.out of the war as quickly as possible. On_February 
9, Colonel Ali Paasonen of the Finnish intelligence department reported 
to the Diet that the Axis powers would probably lose the war. The 
54 Mazour, p. 157. 
SSW . uor1nen, Finland in World War g: 1939-1944, p. 150. 
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Finnish government decided that it was imperative to find some way of 
reaching a peace settlement with the Soviet Union, On March 20, the 
United States offered to help negotiate an end to the war, and Foreign 
Minister Henrik Ramsay, who wanted peace for Finland, o/isited Berlin 
on March 26 to discuss the American proposal. Ramsay was told that 
acceptance of the American offer would weaken relations between Finland 
and Germany; Germany further demanded that the Finnish government sign 
a treaty guaranteeing that neither side would agree to a separate 
peace, When Ryti refused to agree to the proposal, Wipert van Bluecher, 
the German Minister, angrily left Helsinki. The Finnish government 
turned down the American offer to avoid further German displeasure. 56 
The German government continued to pressure Finland into signing a 
treaty of alliance, and Finland continued to resisto 
In June, 1943, Germany began to hold up shipments of food, gasoline, 
and oil to force the Finns to give in. When the government of Finland 
at last made it plain that no treaty such as the Germans proposed would 
be considered, the German government, faced with other difficulties, 
decided not to force the issue. Ribbentrop brought the matter of an 
alliance treaty up again in November but was informed by the Foreign 
Affairs Committee that such a pact would never be approved by the Diet 
and would only cause difficulties between Finland and Germany. Thus, by 
the end of January, 1944, Finland had avoided a formal alliance that 
would have made it impossible to withdraw from the war without German 
. . 57 permission. 
56 Mazour, pp. 158-159. 
57wuorinen, Finland in World War II: 1939-1944, pp. 154-155. 
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On February 16, 1944, Paasikivi met with Alexandra Kallontay, the 
Russian Minister to Sweden, to.discuss the possible terms of peace. The 
Russian requirements were (1) severance of Finnish relations with 
Germany and internment of German soldiers in Finland, (2) withdrawal of 
Finnish troops to the 1940 bol!ders of Finland, (3) immediate return of 
Russian prisoners of war and interned citizens, and (4) discussions on 
reparations and Petsamo. On February 29, the Diet asked that the 
negotiations begin before acceptance or rejection of the Soviet terms. 
When the Soviet Union denied this request, the Diet rejected the demands 
completely although keeping in touch with Russia through Stockholm. In 
a move kept secret from Germany, Paasikivi and Carl Enckell were sent 
58 to Moscow on March 25, 1944. 
On the first of April, they retµrned to Finland with Russian terms 
which were very severe and almost impossible to meet. In addition to 
Finnish internment of German troops, restoration of the 1940 boundaries, 
and return of Russian prisoners of war, Finland was to reduce its army 
to peacetime levels, pay six hundred million dollars in reparations 
over a five-year period, and cede Petsamo to the Soviet Union. 59 
Finland was required to demobilize its army at the same time it was 
driving out the Germans; the Germans were to be int:erned or ousted from 
Finland within a month. The reparations demand was impossible to meet 
within five years. Based on these considerations, Finland rejected the 
Soviet terms on April 12. However, the Soviet government kept the way 
open to further negotiations. 
58Ibid., pp. 163-167. 
59Ibid., pp. 167-170. 
77 
On June 9, 1944, the Red army began an offensive against Finnish 
forces in the Karelian Isthmus. Supported by one of the heaviest 
artillery aircraft bombardments of the war, the Russians broke through 
the Finnish defenses, and, on June 20, took Vyborg. Finnish troops 
were brought from eastern Karelia but were delayed by Russian attacks 
in that area too long to affect the outcome of the struggle of Vyborg .• 
The Finns were faced with two alternatives: make peace with Russia or 
seek greater aid from Germany. On June 23, Russia announced that peace 
could be concluded if Finland were willing to surrender before negotia-
tions began. On the other hand, Germany promised to send aircraft and 
ground troops to aid the Finns, but Ribbentrop was also in Helsinki 
demanding a formal alliance as a condition of such aia. 6° Finland 
desparately needed the German help, but the Diet was opposed to binding 
the Finnish people to Germany in the way that Ribbentrop desiredo 
On June 26, President Ryti broke the impasse by sending a personal 
letter to Hitler declaring that Finland would not withdraw from the war 
as long as he was president. The Diet was not, consulted; no official 
treaty of alliance was concluded. 61 The Ryti proclamation was merely 
an assurance that the Ryti government would continue the war and in no 
way committed any future government to the same course. German aid 
increased; an infantry division and an assault gun brigade arrived in 
Finland and was helpful in stopping the Soviet drive. The main factor 
in holding the drive was Russian strategy, however. After driving the 
Finns back to the 1940 borders, the Russian leaders decided that the 
60The Times (London, June 30, 1944), p. 4o 
61Ibid. 
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troops were needed elsewhere, Ryti's statement had been the wisest 
course for Finland under the circumstances. The pledge could be disre-
garded if Ryti resigned and a new government was formed. Therefore, 
Finland was provided with a way out of the "alliance" Ryti had made 
with Germany. At the same time, the pledge was enough to satisfy 
Germany and insure the supply of material vitally neede4 py Finland. 
The question was whether this aid would be enough, 
CHAPTER IV 
THE END OF THE WAR 
With German aid, the Finns had managed to halt the Russian assault 
of June, 1944, but the Finnish military position was still most 
unfavorable. Mannerheim warned that future Soviet attacks would be 
difficult to fight off, Furthermore, the Germans were forced to with-
draw their units in southern Finland to reinforce other areas. 
Luftwaffe forces were transferred from Finland in mid-July; ground units 
were withdrawn at the end of the month. 1 While a large German army 
remained in northern Finland, it could not be relied on to help repulse 
Russian drives in the south. 
With the withdrawal of German forces, the Finnish government was 
forced to reconsider the possibility of concluding peace with the Soviet 
Union. Diplomatic contact had been maintained between the Russian 
Minister in Stockholm, Mme, Kollotay, and the Finnish Minister, Georg A. 
Gripenberg. Th~ only obstacle to further negotiations was Ryti's pledge 
not to make peace without first consulting Germany. On July 28, leaders 
of the Finnish government met at Mannerheim's country house in Sairala. 
As a result of this meeting, the Ryti government decided to resign. On 
lw O uorinen, Finland and World War ..!l.= 1939-1944, p. 175. 
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July 29, the Finnish legation in Sweden was informed that a new govern-
ment was being formed. 2 Since the Ryti proclamation had only applied to 
the Ryti government, the new government felt free to conclude a peace 
treaty with the Soviet Union. 
Ryti officially resigned as president on August 1, 1944, and the 
Diet elected Mannerheim as his successor on August 4. By the time 
Mannerheim came to power, the Finnish army had only enough annnunition 
and supplies to last two or three months, Mannerheim personally held 
the opinion that Finnish defenses could last but a few days in the event 
of a major Soviet offensive. Germany, anxious to keep Finland in the 
war against Russia, threatened military action against ports in the Gulf 
of Bothnia and ianorthern Finland if the Finnish government abandoned 
Germany. Field Marshal Keitel visited Mannerheim on August 17 to 
ascertain the significance of the change in governments. Because of 
these developments, Mannerheim delayed any action in seeking peace, 
other than informing Keitel that Finland was no longer bound by the 
3 Ryti agreement. 
On August 26, however, Foreign Minister Carl Enckell instructed 
Gripenberg to inform Kollontay that Finland would be willing to discuss 
peace on the basis of the Russian terms of March 25, 1944. Three days 
later, Russia sent the reply that negotiations could begin on the 
condition that Finland would sever relations with Germany and order 
German troops withdrawn from Finnish territory by September 15. This 
2Earl F. Ziemcke, Stalingrad to Berlin: The German pefeat in the 
East (Washington: United States Army, 1968), p. 387. 
3Gripenberg, Finland and the Great Powers, pp. 338-3490 
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condition was accepted on September 2. A cease-fire between the Soviet 
Union and Finland was arranged on September 5, and a Finnish delegation 
arrived in Moscow on September 7 to negotiate a new treaty. 4 
Negotiations lasted from September 7 to September 19. The Russian 
terms were harsh, involving further cessions of Finnish territory, a 
heavy reparations indemnity, and other terms which were difficult for 
the Finns to accept. Among other provisions was the demand that Ryti, 
Tanner, and other Finnish leaders be tried as war criminals and that all 
Fascist organizations be outlawed. There was little discussion; the 
Finns realized that further fighting would mean the destruction of their 
country. They felt that the only way to preserve Finnish independence 
and prevent Soviet occupation was to agree to the Russian terms. An 
armistice agreement was signed on September 19 and ratified by the Diet 
on the same day. Finland accepted the 1940 boundaries; the Finnish army 
had already been forced back to this frontier. The Hangoe area was 
returned to Finland in exchange for the Porkkala peninsula, much nearer 
to Helsinki. The entire Petsamo region was ceded to the Soviet Union, 
and the Aaland Islands were demilitarized. Finland was required to pay 
a three hundred million-dollar indemnity over a six-year period. 
Finally, Finland was to reduce its army to a peacetime level of about 
35,000 men and give Russia the use of airfields and ports in southern 
Finland until Germany surrendered. 5 
The German troops in northern Finland presented a problem. The 
200,000 men of the German Twentieth Alpine Army occupied all of Finland 
4Ibid., pp. 349-362. 
5Mazour, Finland Between East and West, pp. 168-170. 
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north of the Oulu River. By the terms of the armistice they were to be 
expelled or interned within two weeks, The Germans had been caught off 
guard by the Finnish armistice. Faced by Allied successes in France, 
Poland, Italy, and the Balkans, Germany could do little to keep Finland 
in the war. A half-hearted attempt was made to form a rival government 
to the Mannerheim cabinet in northern Finland, but the Finnish people, 
tired of war, were not interested. The Finnish army might have 
continued the fight had not Mannerheim staked his enormous prestige 
against continuing the struggle. On September 6, the Germans began to 
withdraw into Petsamo, which was now considered Russian territory. 6 
Despite the German withdrawal, relations between the retreating 
German troops and the Finns remained cordial for a time. On September 
15, the port.of Oulu was turned over to the Finns. The first outbreak 
of fighting between Finns and Germans occurred on September 15, 1944, 
when a German landing force tried to take the island of Suursaari in 
the Gulf of Finland before it changed from Finnish to Russian hands. 
The Finnish garrison opened fire on the first wave, and Soviet air 
attacks prevented the second wave from landing. About 700 Germans were 
killed and another 700 taken prisoner by the Finns. 7 
The Finnish government made an agreement with the Germans for a 
gradual withdrawal from Finland. The Germans retreated slowly and in an 
orderly fashion, followed by Finnish troops. On September 28, 1933, 
fighting broke out between Germans and Finns at Pudasjaervi. By 
October 1, the fighting had spread to the ports of Kemi and Tornio. 
6ziemcke, pp. 390-391. 
7Ibid., p. 394. 
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General Siilasvuo, who had been under German command, was ordered to 
drive the Germans out. Actual fighting was over by October 8. The 
Germans continued their withdrawal, followed by Finnish patrols. Al-
though the German withdrawal from Finland took until January 30, 1945, 
th f h f . h O 8 ere was no urt er ig ting. 
As the Germans retreated, they resorted to a "scorched earth" 
policy, destroying homes, businesses, schools, and churches in addition 
to roads and bridges. At least a third of Finland was devastated in a 
campaign which seems to have been motivated as much by a desire for 
b . "d . 9 revenge as y strategic consi erations. As a part of their program of 
destruction, the town of Rovaniemi was totally destroyed, and the 
Petsamo nickel mines were wrecked beyond repair. 
The armistice had provided that members of the Ryti government be 
tried as war criminals, and the Finnish Diet passed a law ordering that 
anyone who contributed decisively to Finnish participation with Germany 
against the Soviet Union would be punished. Th~ law also provided that 
convicted prisoners could be released on probation after serving half 
of their sentences. The trials, which lasted from November 15, 1945, to 
February 21, 1946, convicted Ryti, former Prime Ministers Edwin Linkomies 
and J. W. Rangell, Ministers of Finance Vaeinoe Tanner and Tyko Reinikka, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Henrik Ramsay, Minister of Education Antti 
Kukkonen, and Minister of Berlin, T. M. Kivimaeki. Ryti was sentenced 
to ten years of hard labor, Rangell to six years, Linkomies and Tanner 
to five and a half years, Kivimaeki to five years, Ramsay to two and a 
8Ibid., pp. 395-396. 
9 Mazour, pp. 170-171. 
half years, and Kukkonen and Reinikka to two years. All of these men 
were released on probation after serving half of their sentences. 10 
While the Communist news services in various parts of the world pro-
tested against their release, there was no legal challenge, since the 
terms of both the law and the armistice had been fulfilled. 
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On February 19, 1947, a peace treaty between Finland and the Soviet 
Union was signed in Paris. The treaty confirmed the territorial and 
reparations provisions of the original armistice agreement. Further-
more, Finnish military activities were permanently curtailed, and 
Finnish responsibilities in keeping future peace and paying its war 
reparations bill were specified. While Finland was not to be occupied 
as Germany, Austria, Japan, and certain other Axis powers had been, it 
was disarmed to the point that it could be considered harmless. While 
the treaty was a violation of some of the moral pronouncements of the 
Allies, such as the Atlantic Charter, it seems to have been justified 
on the grounds that, as a tBtion which had supported Germany, Finland 
was fortunate not to be dealt harsher treatment, 
The position taken by the signatories of the treaty other than 
Finland and Russia--Great Britain, South Africa, Australia, Canada, and 
several others--was rather contradictory to their actions in other areas 
of the war. For instance, Italy changed sides under much the same 
circumstances as Finland, yet, Italy was given little more than a repri-
mand from the Alliesa Finland was condemned for not breaking with 
Germany and pulling out of the war earlier. The United States and 
Great Britain largely ignored what happened to nations which had 
lOibid., pp. 171-173. 
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switched sides. Italy and Hungary deserted the German cause; both were 
occupied by Germany and devastated when the German troops were at last 
forced to retreat. That the same thing could have happened to Finland--
and did occur to a large extent--was overlooked. According to the 
principles of the Atlantic Charter of 1941, Finland should have been 
restored to her 1939 boundaries; instead, even more Finnish land was 
taken. 
The 1947 treaty largely ignores the reason for the Finnish resump-
tion of war against the Soviet Union. Finland did not go to war in 
1941 to gain more land; the Finns merely wanted what they felt belonged 
to them. When they did go beyond the 1939 borders, it was only to gain 
more security for Finland; greater security could best be attained 
through a shorter and more defensible frontier than that of 1940. That 
kind of security was needed because Finland had no guarantee that the 
Soviet Union would respect the 1939 boundaries if Finland stopped there, 
If Great Britain and the United States had been willing or able to 
guarantee absolutely that the Soviet Union would not demand boundaries 
other than those of 1939, Finland might have been willing to stop at 
those boundaries. 
The results of the war were far-reaching·and lasting. The Soviet 
Union eventually cancelled half of the Finnish debt and extended the 
deadline for the payment. Finland was able to retire its debt to 
Russia on September 19, 1952. The"Porkkala district, which replaced 
Hangoe as the important Soviet naval base in Finland, was returned to 
the Finns in September, 1955. Finland had suffered the loss of about 
75,000 men, about seven percent of its total population, in a series of 
three wars against Russia and Germany. The northern part of Finland 
had been desolated in a campaign of revenge by the Germans. 
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Finland was still independent, however; except for the Porkkala 
garrison, no Russian troops occupied Finnish soilo While Finland's 
industrial potential was damaged by the loss of the Karelian Isthmus 
and the Petsamo region, the country was still able to produce enough 
goods to pay off the Russians within the eight-year period allowed 
them. Despite the virtual isolation forced on Finland by the signing 
of the Paris treaty of 1947, Finland remained independent and was 
eventually able to return to some measure of its former prosperity. 
In concluding Finland's role in World War II, and in particular the 
co-operation between Finland and Germany from June 22, 1941, to 
September 19, 1944, the following generalizations can be made. Prior 
to the Winter War, Finland would have been willing to make boundary 
concessions in the Karelian Isthmus for the security of Leningrad. 
Possibly, the Finns could have adopted a more conciliatory attitude; 
however, the settlement imposed by the Russians in 1940 went far beyond 
their demands of the previous October, and gave the Finns no compensation 
in other are~s. The final peace terms of the 1940 treaty stripped 
Finland of its finest industrial region. Furthermore, the interference 
of the Soviet Union in internal Finnish affairs seemed to be part of a 
Russian program to terminate the independence of Finland.· In order to 
regain their lost territories and safeguard their independence, the 
Finns were willing to join Germany in a renewed war against Russia in 
1941. 
Finland's decision to co-operate with Germany against Russia was 
based on the fact that Finland had no hope of winning a war without aid 
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of other nations, After the fall of France and the apparent defeat of 
Great Britain, the Finns had no one to turn to except Germany. While 
the Finnish and German troops co-operated militarily, their war aims 
were different. Germany fought to gain more territory; Finland fought 
to guarantee Finnish independence and security. Finland fought a 
separate war, only taking such action as was necessary to regain 
Finnish territory and make it secure from Russian air and land attacks. 
Finnish and German co-operation was limited to areas in which German 
and Finnish interests coincided. Finland resisted German pressure to 
take action which could not be justified as increasing Finnish security, 
as in the cases of participation against Leningrad and Murmansk. The 
Ryti agreement came about only when military conditions were such that 
only German aid could halt the Russian drive and after Germany withheld 
its aid until Finland agreed not to make a separate peace. Finnish 
co-operation with Germany was caused by circumstances of the day and 
the need for an ally, Until June 26, 1944, Finland was not an ally of 
Germany in the sense that their war aims and policies were linked, as 
was the case between the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet 
Union. 
Finland stayed in the war because no practical way was ever pro-
vided to withdraw. If the United States and ,Great Britain had been 
willing or able to persuade the Soviet Union to guarantee Finland its 
1939 boundaries and provide definite safeguards for Finnish indepen-
dence, Finland would probably have been willing to withdraw from the 
war and possibly deny the use of northern Finland to German troops by 
early 1942. However, the American and British practice of demanding 
that Finland withdraw to its 1939 frontier without guarantees from the 
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Soviet Union that this border would be respected in the future could 
not be accepted by the Finns. The experiences of Finland in the Winter 
War made such action unacceptable. 
The key to German-Finnish relations is expediency under existing 
circumstances, The Finns had to change their position constantly to 
meet changing military and political conditions. One set policy 
could not be followed without risking disaster. If the policy followed 
proved to be wrong, it was usually because the conditions had changed. 
Co-operation with Germany proved to be the wrong course of action 
because Germany lost the war, In June, 1941, this outcome could not be 
foreseen, especially since military experts all over the world were sure 
that Russia would collapse under the German attack. However, as a 
result of their leaders' mistake, the Finnish people and nation paid 
one of the highest prices, in.proportion to size, of any nation in 
Europe during World War II. 
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